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1 Introduction
Intermediaries are important players in the economy.1 Many intermediaries carry multiple
di¤erent products, and serve buyers with multiproduct demand. Examples include retail-
ers such as supermarkets and department stores, shopping malls, TV platforms, travel
agencies, and trade intermediaries. However much of the existing literature focuses on
single-product intermediaries. Our paper builds a new framework to study multiproduct
intermediaries when consumers demand multiple products and have search frictions. We
then use this framework to address several important questions. For example, how can
a multiproduct intermediary create value and therefore protably exist? Which products
should the intermediary carry, and for which of them should it be the exclusive supplier
in the market? Surprisingly there is very little existing research about this, even though
in practice the decision of which products to carry is one of the most important choices
faced by intermediaries.2 We also ask, is the intermediary too big or too small relative
to the social optimum, and does it carry qualitatively the rightproducts? Further, it is
increasingly easy for sellers to bypass traditional intermediaries and sell direct to buyers.
What are the possible consequences of this new trend, and how should intermediaries
respond?
Our framework can shed light on some important developments in retail (and other
intermediary) markets. Traditionally, most manufacturers could only reach consumers via
retailers. However in recent years this has changed. Manufacturers of many di¤erent types
of product now sell direct-to-consumer (DTC).3 A survey by the European Commission
(2017) found that the percentage of EU manufacturers selling direct is as high as 85%
in clothing and shoes, and above 50% in ve other product categories. Many established
brands like Nike and Nestle sell direct via their own website or physical store, while
smaller brands do so via online marketplaces like Amazon and Tmall.4 (Direct sales are
1Krakovsky (2015) suggests that middlemen are responsible for around one third of US GDP.
2Writing in the Harvard Business Review, Fisher and Vaidyanathan (2012) argue that successful
retailers must be good on a number of dimensions... But assortment is number one.A good product
assortment is crucial for attracting shoppers, who are often time-constrained and therefore shop at a
few retailers whose product range closely meets their needs. At the same time, even large retailers like
Walmart cannot stock all products desired by consumers, either due to space constraints, or because
stocking too many products makes the instore shopping experience less pleasant.
3As an example, in 2017 DTC wine sales in the US were worth $2.7 billion, almost 10% of the total
(US) market (see https://bit.ly/30qNQVq). DTC sales are also becoming popular in industries such as
traditional packaged goods, consumer electronics, and travel services (see https://bit.ly/2VKiB8e).
4Nikes DTC sales in 2017 were worth $10.4 billion, and it set itself the goal of increasing them to
$16 billion by 2020 (see https://on.wsj.com/2ITY5wN and https://bit.ly/2DgV706). According to the
European Commission (2017), 20% of respondent manufacturers sell via marketplaces. Meanwhile the
consulting rm Oliver Wyman (2018) found that more than half of US online sales of general merchandise
in 2016 were direct (via either the manufacturersown websites or marketplaces).
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also gaining traction in other markets, such as those for TV platforms.) Commentators
have argued that DTC will grow further in the coming years and risks undermining
traditional retailersone-stop shopping business model. Some have even linked DTC to
the closure of certain retailers and the sluggish performance of others.5 Our paper o¤ers
a framework in which to assess these claims, and to study how retailers should respond
as DTC sales become more prevalent.
Another important trend in retail markets is exclusivity. Exclusivity agreements be-
tween manufacturers and retailers are increasingly common, and already exist for a wide
variety of products including toys, furniture, and even groceries.6 Macys has signed ex-
clusive deals with several brands, and set itself the goal of increasing the percentage of
products that are unique to its stores from 29% in 2017 to 40% in 2020. Similarly, Tar-
get is well-known for its exclusive deals with designers of apparel and homeware.7 Our
paper o¤ers a framework to think about the incentives to enter into exclusivity arrange-
ments, which products should be stocked exclusively, and how DTC and other changes in
technology may a¤ect the propensity to use exclusivity agreements.
Section 2 of our paper introduces the baseline model. It is mainly developed for
retailers but, as we discuss later, the setup and some of the main insights also apply to a
broader set of multiproduct intermediaries including shopping malls, TV platforms, and
trade intermediaries. There is a unit mass of manufacturers, each of which produces a
di¤erent product. Consumers view these products as independent and are interested in
buying all of them. Consumers have the same demand for a given product, but di¤erent
products have di¤erent demands. There is also one multiproduct intermediary. A product
can be sold to consumers either directly by the manufacturer, or by the intermediary,
or through both these channels. The intermediary compensates a manufacturer whose
product it carries by way of a two-part tari¤, and can request exclusive sales rights. The
intermediary may also be limited in how many products it can stock. Consumers must
incur a search cost to learn a sellers price(s) and buy its product(s), and the search
cost is proportional to the time needed to visit it. We normalize the time needed to
search a measure one of manufacturers to one, and assume the time needed to search
the intermediary is weakly increasing in how many products it carries. (In the retail
example, the latter would be consistent with the idea that larger retailers are located
further from consumers, or are harder to navigate.) An important feature of our model
is that consumers di¤er in their cost of time and so di¤er in their search cost.
Since the focus of our paper is product range choice, we intentionally simplify sell-
5See for example https://on.wsj.com/2V2i6lx and https://bit.ly/2DgV706, and also Section 6.
6A survey by GfK (2007) for the UK Competition Commission found that 35% of grocery-product
suppliers had been asked to enter an exclusivity agreement, and 19% had done so. Gielens et al (2014)
give examples of exclusive products by well-known manufacturers like Procter and Gamble and Unilever.
7See https://bit.ly/2IjQ82U and https://bit.ly/2DaS2ys for further details.
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erspricing problems. In our model, irrespective of the market structure each supplier
of a given product always charges the usual monopoly price.8 We then argue that all
information about a products cost and demand curve can be summarized using a simple
two-dimensional statistic (; v), where  represents a products monopoly prot and v
represents its monopoly consumer surplus. This enables us to study product range choice
in a tractable way, since it reduces a potentially complicated product space into a simpler
two-dimensional one. Specically, the intermediarys problem is to choose a set of points
within the (; v) space that it will stock exclusively, and another set of points which it
will stock non-exclusively.
In Sections 3 and 4 we solve for the intermediarys optimal product range, rst in a
simple case to provide some initial intuition, and then in the general case. Unlike the
standard single-product case, we show that a multiproduct intermediary can earn strictly
positive prot even when it does not improve consumer search e¢ ciency. The underly-
ing mechanism is related to the classic bundling argument, and it relies on consumers
multiproduct demand and heterogeneous search costs and the availability of exclusive
contracts. We also show that the value from stocking a product can be split into a direct
and indirect component. The direct component represents the prot earned through
selling that product. It includes compensation paid to the manufacturer and can there-
fore be negative. The indirect component reects cross-product externalities i.e. the way
in which stocking a new product may either increase or decrease how many consumers
search the intermediary, and thereby change the protability of the intermediarys other
products.
The optimal stocking policy itself consists of three distinct regionsin the (; v) space.
Firstly, the intermediary stocks some products with high-v but low- exclusively. These
products make a direct loss but they help attract consumers due to their high v.9 Secondly,
the intermediary recoups these losses by stocking some other very protable products with
low-v but high-. However since these products have low v they may dissuade consumers
from searching, and so in general the intermediary avoids stocking too many of them.
Thirdly, depending on the intermediarys stocking constraint and search technology, it
may also stock some products with high-v and high- non-exclusively. These products
break even but can have a positive indirect e¤ect. Compared to the social optimum, we
argue that the intermediary tends to stock too many products, and to stock too many of
8Intuitively, with two-part tari¤s the intermediary buys marginal units from a manufacturer at cost.
Given that consumers have homogeneous preferences and do not observe price before search, the logic
of Diamond (1971) then implies that there is no price competition even if a product is sold by both its
upstream supplier and the intermediary. As we discuss more in Section 2, the monopoly pricing itself is
not crucial for our analysis - what matters is that the price of each product is the same across sellers.
9The result that exclusive products help attract consumers to visit but may incur a loss for the
retailer is similar to, but di¤erent from, the usual loss-leader argument. Here the loss is due to the high
compensation required by the manufacturer, instead of below-cost pricing.
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them exclusively. Nevertheless the intermediary can be welfare-enhancing due to the way
it a¤ects consumersincentives to search.
Section 5 studies two applications of our framework. Section 5.1 discusses the optimal
design of a shopping mall which acts as a platform and does not directly resell products.
Our framework provides insights about which shops should join the mall and how much
they should pay to do so, as well as the externalities they exert on other shops. Section 5.2
applies our framework to DTC sales. When DTC sales become easier the intermediary has
to compensate manufacturers more for stocking their products, and so not surprisingly
manufacturers are better o¤ but the intermediary is worse o¤. More importantly, we
also show that the intermediary should respond to easier DTC sales by stocking fewer
products, but stocking a greater proportion of them exclusively. As we explain in more
detail later on, we also nd that the optimal product selection becomes more polarized
in the (; v) space, and both a products easiness to be sold direct and its location in the
(; v) space a¤ect whether (and how much) its direct sales take o¤. Moreover, easier DTC
sales in one sector can induce manufacturers in other (una¤ected) sectors to also sell more
direct, due to a spillover e¤ect. Finally, we show by example that if the intermediary fails
to adjust its product selection in this way, it can end up with negative prot and thus
have to exit the market altogether.
The remainder of the paper is then structured as follows. Section 6 provides evidence
for the key economic forces in our model and its main predictions. In Section 7 we rst
provide a foundation for the (; v) product space and interpret di¤erent points within
it. We then present two extensions and show that our main insights are qualitatively
robust to demand heterogeneity and upstream competition. Finally Section 8 concludes
and discusses the potential application of our framework to other types of intermediary.
All proofs are available in the Online Appendix.
1.1 Related literature
There is already a substantial body of literature on intermediaries (see e.g. the book by
Spulber (1999)). An intermediary may exist because it improves the search and match-
ing e¢ ciency between buyers and sellers (e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Gehrig
(1993), Spulber (1996), and Shevchenko (2004)), or because it acts as an expert or certi-
er that mitigates the asymmetric information problem between buyers and sellers (e.g.
Biglaiser (1993), Lizzeri (1999), and Biglaiser and Li (2018)).10 We study intermediaries
in an environment with search frictions, but in our model an intermediary can protably
exist even if it does not improve search e¢ ciency. Our model features consumers demand-
10Other reasons why retailers in particular may exist are i) they know more about consumer demand
than manufacturers do, ii) they can internalize pricing externalities when products are substitutes or
complements, and iii) they may be more e¢ cient in marketing activities due to economies of scale.
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ing multiple products and having heterogeneous search costs and the possibility of using
exclusive contracts.11 These features distinguish our model from existing work on inter-
mediaries. Since our main focus is the retail market, we also study optimal product range
and the impact of DTC sales, neither of which are typically addressed by the intermediary
literature.
The mechanism by which an intermediary makes prot from stocking multiple prod-
ucts is reminiscent of bundling (e.g. Stigler (1968), Adams and Yellen (1976), McAfee et al
(1989), and Chen and Riordan (2013)). By stocking some products that consumers value
highly but are not available elsewhere, the intermediary induces consumers to visit and
buy other low-value (but fairly protable) products as well which consumers would other-
wise not buy. However since our paper focuses on product selection, it is more related to
the question of which products a rm should bundle, something which is rarely discussed
in the bundling literature. Rayo and Segal (2010) use the same bundling argument in a
di¤erent setting with information design. They show that an information platform often
prefers partial information disclosure, in the sense of pooling two negatively correlated
prospects into one signal. (For example a search engine may pool a high-relevance but
low-prot ad with a low-relevance but high-prot ad.) Unlike us, they consider a discrete
framework and (more importantly) they allow the information platform to send an arbi-
trary number of signals (which in our framework, would be like allowing the intermediary
to organize and sell non-overlapping products in multiple stores). Consequently their op-
timization problem is very di¤erent from ours. Moreover many other important features
of our model, such as the role of exclusivity and the importance of search economies, have
no counterpart in their paper (or in the wider bundling literature).
Our paper is also related to the growing literature on multiproduct search (e.g. McAfee
(1995), Shelegia (2012), Zhou (2014), Rhodes (2015), and Kaplan et al (2019)). Existing
papers usually investigate how multiproduct consumer search a¤ects multiproduct retail-
erspricing decisions when their product range is exogenously given. Our paper departs
from this literature by focusing on product range choice, another important decision for
multiproduct retailers.12 Moreover our paper introduces manufacturers and so explicitly
models the vertical structure of the retail market. In this sense it is also related to recent
research on consumer search in vertical markets such as Janssen and Shelegia (2015),
and Asker and Bar-Isaac (2020), although those works consider single-product search and
address very di¤erent economic questions.
Finally, our paper is also related to research on product assortment in operations
11In Spiegler (2000) two agents create surplus when they interact. A third party which does not improve
e¢ ciency can extract this surplus through exclusive-interactioncontracts, which force the agents into
a Prisoners Dilemma. Our paper studies a very di¤erent type of exclusivity arrangement.
12Rhodes and Zhou (2019) also study retailersendogenous product range, but they consider a stylized
merger setup with only two products.
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research and marketing (see e.g. the survey by Kök et al (2015)). Typically this literature
focuses on a situation where consumers demand a single product, and studies the optimal
number of (symmetric) varieties of that product to stock. Our paper focuses instead on a
retailers optimal product range choice when consumers have multiproduct demand. We
study this issue with explicit upstream manufacturers and consumer shopping frictions,
neither of which is usually considered in the above mentioned literature.13
2 The Model
There is a continuum of manufacturers with measure one, and each produces a di¤erent
product. Manufacturer i has constant marginal cost ci  0. There is also a unit mass of
consumers, who are interested in buying every product. The products are independent,
and each consumer wishes to buy Qi(pi) units of product i when its price is pi. When
a consumer buys multiple products, her surplus is additive over these products. We
assume that Qi(pi) is downward-sloping and well-behaved such that (pi   ci)Qi(pi) is
single-peaked at the monopoly price pmi . Per-consumer monopoly prot and consumer
surplus from product i are respectively denoted by
i  (pmi   ci)Qi(pmi ) and vi 
Z 1
pmi
Qi(p)dp . (1)
Manufacturers can sell their product direct to consumers, for example via their own
retail outlet.14 In addition there is one multiproduct intermediary, which can buy products
from manufacturers and resell them to consumers. The intermediary has no resale cost,
but can stock at most a measure m  1 of the products. We assume that the intermediary
has all the bargaining power, and simultaneously makes take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to each
manufacturer whose product it wishes to stock.15 These o¤ers can be either exclusive
(meaning that only the intermediary can sell the product to consumers) or non-exclusive
(meaning that both the intermediary and the relevant manufacturer can sell the product
to consumers). In both cases we suppose that the intermediary o¤ers two-part tari¤s,
consisting of a wholesale unit price  i and a lump-sum fee Ti. The intermediary also
informs manufacturers about which products it intends to stock, and whether it intends
13Bronnenberg (2020) considers a model where consumers like variety but dislike shopping, so retailers
stock multiple varieties to reduce consumersshopping costs. His model is otherwise very di¤erent from
ours, as are the questions it studies. For example in his model varieties are symmetric, and so he does
not look at the optimal composition of a retailers product line.
14Alternatively, we can interpret direct sales as a manufacturer selling through an independent specialist
retailer. If the manufacturer can make a take-it-or-leave-it two-part tari¤ o¤er to the specialist retailer,
all our analysis and results remain unchanged.
15Our results do not change qualitatively if instead the intermediary and manufacturer share any prots
proportionally that are earned from sales of the latters product.
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to stock them exclusively or non-exclusively.16 Manufacturers who received an o¤er then
simultaneously accept or reject.
Consumers know where each product is available, but do not observe the terms of
any upstream contracts. Moreover consumers cannot observe a rms price(s) or buy its
product(s) without incurring a search cost.17 Consumers di¤er in terms of their unit
search cost s, which is distributed in the population according to a cumulative distri-
bution function F (s) with support (0; s]. The corresponding density function f(s) is
everywhere di¤erentiable, strictly positive, and uniformly bounded with maxs f(s) <1.
If a consumer searches a measure n of manufacturers, she incurs a total search cost n s.
If a consumer also searches the intermediary, and the intermediary stocks a measure m of
products, she incurs an additional search cost h(m)  s. We can thus interpret s as the
opportunity cost of time, with the time needed to visit a measure one of manufacturers
normalized to 1, and the time needed to visit the intermediary equal to h (m).18 We
assume that the function h (m) is positive and weakly increasing, reecting the idea that
larger stores may take longer to navigate, and may also be located further out of town.
(Notice that we allow for the case where h (m) is constant and so independent of the
intermediarys size. Below we provide a microfoundation for why h (m) might be strictly
increasing.) We also introduce the following notation: when h (m) < m the intermediary
generates economies of search, and when h (m) > m it generates diseconomies of search.
Finally as is standard, we assume that after searching consumers may costlessly recall
past o¤ers.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the rst stage, the intermediary simulta-
neously makes o¤ers to manufacturers whose product it would like to stock. An o¤er
species  i and Ti and whether the intermediary will sell the product exclusively or not.
Manufacturers then simultaneously accept or reject. At the second stage, all rms that
sell to consumers choose a retail price for each of their products. The intermediary uses
linear pricing. At the third stage, consumers observe who sells what and form (rational)
expectations about all retail prices. They then search sequentially among rms and make
their purchases. We assume that if consumers observe an unexpected price at some rm,
they hold passive beliefs about the retail prices they have not yet discovered.
2.1 Preliminary analysis
We start with the following useful result.
16This assumption aims to capture the idea that in practice negotiations evolve over time, such that
manufacturers can (roughly) observe what other products the intermediary stocks.
17Our assumptions here try to capture the idea that a retailers product range is usually reasonably
steady over time, whilst its prices are easier to adjust.
18In Section 5 we allow the time needed to buy from a manufacturer to vary across products.
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Lemma 1 (i) In any equilibrium where each product market is active, each seller of a
product charges consumers the relevant monopoly price.
(ii) If product i is stocked exclusively by the intermediary, the intermediary o¤ers the
manufacturer a wholesale unit price  i = ci and a lump-sum payment Ti = iF (vi). If
product i is stocked non-exclusively by the intermediary, in terms of studying the opti-
mal product range, it is without loss of generality to focus on the contracting outcome
where the intermediary o¤ers the manufacturer  i = ci and Ti at a level that ensures the
manufacturers total payo¤ is iF (vi).
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 1, recall that a product can be sold in
three di¤erent ways. Firstly product i may be sold only by its manufacturer. Consumers
then face a standard hold-up problem (see e.g. Stiglitz (1979) and Anderson and Renault
(2006)). Since consumers only learn the manufacturers price after they have sunk their
search cost, the manufacturer optimally charges the monopoly price pmi .
19 Consumers
rationally anticipate this and therefore search if and only if s  vi. Consequently the
manufacturer earns a prot iF (vi). Notice that this is also the manufacturers outside
option if the intermediary makes it an o¤er.
Continuing with the intuition for Lemma 1, secondly product i may be sold exclusively
by the intermediary. Since consumers do not observe the price before searching, the
same hold-up argument implies that if the intermediary faces a wholesale price  i, it
will charge the corresponding monopoly price argmax (p   i)Qi (p). Notice that joint
prot earned on product i is maximized when the intermediary charges the monopoly
price pmi , therefore in order to induce this outcome the intermediary proposes  i = ci
i.e. a bilaterally e¢ cient two-part tari¤. The intermediary then drives the manufacturer
down to its outside option by o¤ering it a lump-sum payment Ti = iF (vi). Thirdly
product i may be sold by both its manufacturer and the intermediary. The analysis here
is subtler. Intuitively the intermediary again avoids double-marginalization by proposing
a contract with  i = ci, whilst search frictions eliminate price competition between the
manufacturer and intermediary. In particular, following Diamonds (1971) paradox if
consumers expect both sellers to charge the same price for product i, they will search at
most one of them and hence each nds it optimal to charge the monopoly price. The
manufacturer is compensated for any sales that it loses in signing the contract by way of
a lump-sum transfer.
Given Lemma 1, it is convenient to index products by their per-consumer monopoly
prot and consumer surplus as dened in (1) (rather than by their demand curve Qi (pi)
and cost ci). This helps convert the potentially complicated product space into a two-
dimensional one. Henceforth let 
  R2+ be a two-dimensional product space (; v), and
19As is usual in search models, there also exist other equilibria in which consumers do not search (some)
sellers because they are expected to charge very high prices, and given no consumers search these high
prices can be trivially sustained. We do not consider these uninteresting equilibria in this paper.
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suppose it is compact and convex. Let v  0 and v <1 be the lower and the upper bound
of v. For each v 2 [v; v], there exist 0  (v)  (v) < 1 such that  2 [(v); (v)].
(In Section 7.1 we provide examples of demand functions which can generate this type of
product space.)
Let (
;F ; G) be a probability measure space where F is a -eld which is the set of
all measurable subsets of 
 according to measure G. (In particular, G(
) = 1.) When
there is no confusion, we also use G to denote the joint distribution function of (; v),
and let g be the corresponding joint density function. We assume that g is di¤erentiable
and strictly positive everywhere. If a consumer buys a set A 2 F of products at their
monopoly prices, she obtains surplus
R
A
vdG before taking into account the search cost.
To avoid trivial corner solutions, we also assume that v  s.
Discussion. Before solving for the intermediarys optimal product range, we rst
discuss some of our modeling assumptions and their implications.
(i) A continuum of products. Considering a continuum of products is mainly for
analytical convenience. A model with a discrete number of products f(i; vi)gi=1;:::;N
would yield qualitatively similar insights but be messier to solve because the optimization
problem would become a combinatorial one.20
(ii) Homogeneous consumer demand. We assume that consumers need all products
and have the same demand for a given product. (Di¤erent consumers will buy di¤erent
products in our model, but only because they di¤er in their search cost.) This ensures
that all sellers of a given product charge the same (monopoly) price, thereby allowing us
to represent products using the (; v) approach. In practice, however, consumers di¤er in
which products they want to buy (and how much). Section 7.2 shows how to incorporate
demand heterogeneity while still using the (; v) approach, and demonstrates that the
key insights are unchanged.
(iii) An alternative interpretation of the demand function. We assume that consumers
have elastic demand for each product. Suppose instead that they have unit demand but
heterogeneous valuations which are drawn independently across products. Suppose also
that consumers make an upfront decision of whether or not to search the intermediary,
and that they can only learn their valuation for a product by searching (one of) its
seller(s).21 Then the (; v) approach is still valid, as is the equilibrium we derive below.
(That is, if the valuation distribution of product i is Di, the same analysis works with
Qi(pi) = 1 Di(pi).) Under this interpretation, consumers with the same search cost will
buy di¤erent products.
20See footnote 25 later for the details. The case with only two products is easy to deal with, but is not
rich enough to study the optimal product range choice in a meaningful way.
21If consumers observe their valuations before they search, the market can collapse due to the well-
known hold-up problem unless the seller sells enough products (see e.g. Rhodes (2015)).
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(iv) An instore-search microfoundation for h(m). Suppose there is a xed cost 0s of
traveling to the intermediary, and a cost 1s to search each product in the store. Also
suppose the intermediary can inuence the consumer search order e.g. via where it places
di¤erent products within the store. We can show that by forcing consumers to search
exclusive high-v products last, the intermediary can induce every consumer who visits to
search all its products.22 Consumers anticipate this, and so the total cost of searching the
intermediary is h(m)s with h(m) = 0 + 1m, which is strictly increasing when 1 > 0.
(v) Lemma 1 and monopoly pricing. The monopoly pricing outcome described in
Lemma 1 enables us to represent products using the (; v) space, and hence study product
range choice in a tractable way. However notice that monopoly pricing is not important
per se - what matters is that each products retail price is the same irrespective of where
it is sold. (For instance there could be a resale price agreement between the manufacturer
and the retailer.) Of course in practice prices can di¤er across retail outlets, and a large
literature already explores this. Our model abstracts from such price dispersion in order
to make progress in understanding optimal product range choice.
3 A Simple Case
We now study the intermediarys optimal product range choice. We start with a simple
case where i) the intermediary can only o¤er exclusive contracts, ii) h (m) = m such that
the intermediary generates no economies of search, and iii) m = 1 such that there is no
stocking space limit. This relatively simple case helps to illustrate some of the important
economic forces inuencing optimal product selection.
We rst solve for a consumers decision of whether or not to search the intermediary.
Suppose the intermediary sells a positive measure of products A 2 F exclusively. If a
consumer of type s visits the intermediary, she will buy all products available there and so
obtain an additional utility
R
A
vdG. At the same time since the size of the intermediary is
m =
R
A
dG, the consumer also incurs an additional search cost s
R
A
dG given h(m) = m.
Consequently a consumer of type s visits the intermediary if and only if s  v^, where
v^ =
R
A
vdGR
A
dG
(2)
is the average consumer surplus of the products sold at the intermediary. (Note that the
consumer searches any product i 62 A at its manufacturer if and only if s  vi, and that
the order in which she searches the intermediary and manufacturers does not matter.)
We now write down the intermediarys optimization problem. The intermediarys
net prot from stocking product (; v) is  [F (v^)  F (v)]: it attracts a mass F (v^) of
22Further details are available on request. This is related to the idea of search diversion in Hagiu and
Jullien (2011).
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consumers and so earns variable prot F (v^), but from Lemma 1 makes a lump-sum
transfer F (v) to the products manufacturer. Consequently the intermediary wishes
to23
max
A2F
Z
A
 [F (v^)  F (v)] dG : (3)
The following simple observation will play an important role in subsequent analysis:
among the products stocked by the intermediary, those with v < v^ generate a prot while
those with v > v^ generate a loss. Intuitively a product with v < v^ generates relatively
few sales when sold by its manufacturer, since consumers anticipate receiving only a low
surplus. When the same product is sold by the intermediary its sales increase, because
more consumers search the intermediary (given its higher expected average surplus v^).
The opposite is true for a product with v > v^, i.e. its demand is shrunk when sold through
the intermediary.
The following lemma is a useful rst step in characterizing the intermediarys optimal
product range.
Lemma 2 The intermediary makes a strictly positive prot. It sells a strictly positive
measure of products but not all products, i.e.
R
A
dG 2 (0; 1).
The intermediary earns strictly positive prot even though h(m) = m, i.e. its search
technology is no more e¢ cient than that of the manufacturers whose products it resells.
To understand why, recall that the intermediary makes a gain on low-v products but a
loss on high-v products, and that these gains and losses are proportional to a products
per-customer protability . Now imagine that the intermediary selects its prot-making
products amongst those with high , and selects its loss-making products amongst those
with low . This strategy seeks to maximize gains on the former, and minimize losses
on the latter, and so might be expected to generate a net positive prot. In the proof
we show by construction that there is always some set A where this logic is correct. On
the other hand, even with no stocking space constraint, the intermediary never stocks all
products.
We now solve explicitly for the optimal set of products stocked by the intermediary.
Instead of working directly with areas in product space 
, it is more convenient to intro-
duce a stocking policy function q (; v) 2 f0; 1g. Then stocking products in a set A 2 F
is equivalent to adopting a measurable stocking policy function where q(; v) = 1 if and
only if (; v) 2 A. The intermediarys problem then becomes
max
q(;v)2f0;1g
Z


q(; v)[F (v^)  F (v)]dG ;
23When
R
A
dG = 0 intermediary prot is zero regardless of how we specify v^. In some later analysis we
consider limit cases where the measure of A goes to zero, and v^ will be well-dened via Lhopitals rule.
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where the average consumer surplus v^ o¤ered by the intermediary solvesZ


q(; v) (v   v^) dG = 0 : (4)
This is an optimization of functionals. It can be shown that this optimization problem
has a solution, and the optimal solution can be derived by treating (4) as a constraint and
using the following Lagrange method. In particular, letting  be the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the constraint (4), the Lagrangian function is
L =
Z


q(; v) [ [F (v^)  F (v)] + (v   v^)] dG : (5)
The valueof stocking product (; v) can be decomposed into a direct and an indirect
e¤ect. The direct e¤ect is the prot  [F (v^)  F (v)] earned on the product. The indirect
e¤ect (v  v^) captures cross-product externalities. Specically, it measures how stocking
product (; v) changes the number of consumers who search the intermediary and thereby
a¤ects the prots earned from other products. We show below that  > 0 and hence the
direct and indirect e¤ects have opposite signs. For example products with v > v^ have a
negative direct e¤ect (as explained above), but a positive indirect e¤ect because stocking
them increases the average surplus o¤ered by the intermediary and so attracts more
consumers to search it and buy other products.
The integrand in (5) is linear in q so the optimal stocking policy is as follows:
q(; v) =
(
1 if  [F (v^)  F (v)] + (v   v^)  0
0 otherwise
:
For given v^ and , let I(v^; ) denote the set of (; v) for which q(; v) = 1. It consists of
the following two regions:
v < v^ and    v^   v
F (v^)  F (v) ; (6)
and
v > v^ and    v^   v
F (v^)  F (v) : (7)
(The intermediary is indi¤erent about whether or not to stock products with v = v^.) The
intermediarys optimal product selection consists of two negatively correlatedregions
in the product space. First, the intermediary stocks products with high v and low .
Products with v > v^ induce consumers to search but also generate a loss. The inter-
mediary minimizes this loss by stocking those with the lowest possible , as this entails
lower payments to manufacturers. Second, the intermediary stocks products with low v
and high . Products with v < v^ make a prot, which the intermediary maximizes by
stocking those with the highest possible . Products in other parts of the (; v) space are
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not stocked: those with low v and low  would generate little direct prot yet dissuade
consumers from searching, and those with high v and high  are too expensive to buy
from their manufacturers.
It then remains to determine v^ and . Firstly, at the optimum v^ is interior and
F (v^) 2 (0; 1).24 Then we can take the rst-order condition of (5) with respect to v^, and
obtain Z
I(v^;)
(f(v^)   )dG = 0 ; (8)
whereupon we observe that  > 0. (Note that  captures the impact on prot of a small
increase in v^, and it equals f(v^) multiplied by the average prot of the intermediarys
products.) Secondly, we have the original constraint (4), which we can rewrite asZ
I(v^;)
(v   v^)dG = 0 : (9)
We therefore have a system of two equations (8) and (9) in two unknowns. If the system
has multiple solutions, the solution that generates the highest prot is the optimal one.
The following result summarizes the above analysis:25
Proposition 1 The intermediary optimally stocks products in the regions of (6) and (7),
where v^ 2 (v; v) and  > 0 jointly solve equations (8) and (9).
Figure 1 depicts the intermediarys optimal product range when the product space is

 = [0; 1]2, the distribution over it is G(; v) = v, and the search cost distribution is
F (s) = s. The intermediary stocks the products in the shaded areas, and total industry
prot is 12:5% higher than it would be with no intermediary.26
24This is because Lemma 2 shows that I(v^; ) has strictly positive measure, which from the denition
of v^ implies v^ 2 (v; v), and moreover by assumption s 2 (0; s] where s  v.
25If we consider a discrete number of products f(i; vi)gi=1;:::;N , the intermediarys problem becomes
maxqi2f0;1g
P
i qii[F (v^) F (vi)] with v^ =
P
i qivi=
P
i qi. This is a combinatorial optimization problem.
In general it is not easy to solve because there are 2N possible stocking policies (which is very large even
for a few dozen products). One approach is to make the problem smooth by allowing stochastic stocking
policies with qi 2 [0; 1], such that we can use the Lagrange method and obtain bang-bang solutions.
However the solutions for v^ and  are then complicated functions of the locations of individual products
in the product space.
26The curve  v^ vF (v^) F (v) which divides up the product space is constant when search costs are uniformly
distributed. Otherwise it slopes up when F (s) is concave, and slopes down when F (s) is convex.
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Figure 1: Optimal product range in the simple case
Finally, we discuss the welfare impact of the intermediary in this simple case. The
intermediary harms consumers because they do not enjoy any search e¢ ciencies (due to
h (m) = m) and because they have less choice (due to exclusivity). Specically, consumers
with s < v^ who search the intermediary buy some low-v products which they otherwise
would not buy. Similarly consumers with s > v^ who do not search the intermediary are
unable to buy some attractive high-v products which are now only available at the inter-
mediary. Nevertheless the intermediary may improve total welfare, dened as the sum of
industry prot and consumer surplus. Indeed this is the case in the above example, where
total welfare increases by about 2:5%. Intuitively, consumers search too few manufactur-
ers: they search and buy only if s < v, but from a welfare perspective they should do so
whenever s <  + v. Moreover amongst products with the same  + v, this problem of
under searchis more severe for those with low-v and high-. Since the intermediarys
optimal product selection leads to an expansion in demand for these products, its presence
can increase total welfare. Nevertheless the intermediary does not account for the harm
it imposes on consumers and so its product selection is not socially optimal. We discuss
the socially optimal product selection in the next section.
4 The General Case
We now consider the general case in which i) the intermediary can o¤er both exclusive and
non-exclusive contracts, ii) the cost of searching the intermediary is h (m) s with h(m)
weakly increasing, and iii) there is a limit m on the measure of products the intermediary
can stock. Let qE (; v) be an indicator function which is 1 if and only if product (; v)
is stocked exclusively, and let qNE (; v) be an indicator function which is 1 if and only
if product (; v) is stocked non-exclusively. Let q(; v) = (qE (; v) ; qNE (; v)) denote
the stocking policy function, and note that q(; v) 2 f(0; 0) ; (0; 1) ; (1; 0)g. It is again
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convenient to let
q(; v)  qE(; v) + qNE(; v) 2 f0; 1g
denote whether or not product (; v) is stocked. Henceforth whenever there is no confusion
we will suppress the arguments (; v) in the stocking policy function.
4.1 Consumer search behavior
We rst solve for consumersoptimal search rule given a stocking policy q. Recall from
Lemma 1 that all sellers of a product charge the same price. Hence a consumer will
never search both the intermediary and a manufacturer whose product is stocked there.
Moreover if a consumer does consider searching a manufacturer, she will only do so if
v > s. It is also straightforward to see that the order in which a consumer visits the
various manufacturers and the intermediary does not matter. Therefore a consumer who
searches the intermediary and has a unit search cost s gets an expected surplus
u1 (s;q) =
Z
qvdG  h
Z
qdG

s+
Z
v>s
(1  q) (v   s) dG ; (10)
where the rst two terms are surplus obtained directly from the intermediary, and the
nal term is surplus obtained by searching products not available at the intermediary.
Notice that only q = qE + qNE matters, and not whether products are stocked exclusively
or non-exclusively.
At the same time, a consumer of type s who does not search the intermediary gets
expected surplus
u0 (s;q) =
Z
v>s
(1  qE) (v   s) dG ; (11)
because she can only buy products which are available from their manufacturers (i.e. those
not stocked exclusively by the intermediary). This surplus is lower when the intermediary
stocks more products exclusively (precisely, for a xed q more products have qE = 1). In
order to ease the exposition, we suppose that a consumer searches the intermediary if and
only if doing so strictly improves her payo¤ (i.e. if u1 (s;q) > u0 (s;q)). The optimal
search rule is as follows:
Lemma 3 Consumers search the intermediary if and only if s < s^, where
(i) s^ = 0 (nobody searches the intermediary) if
R
qEdG = 0 and
R
qdG  h  R qdG.
(ii) s^ > s (everybody searches the intermediary) if
R
qvdG > h
 R
qdG

s.
(iii) s^ 2 (0; s] otherwise and is the unique strictly positive solution to
s^ =
R
v<s^
qvdG+
R
v>s^
qEvdG
h(
R
qdG)  R
v>s^
qNEdG
: (12)
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Intuitively in this general case a consumers decision of whether to search the interme-
diary is inuenced by both the products it stocks (and their exclusivity) and the economy
of search it generates. According to part (i) of the lemma, no consumer visits the inter-
mediary when all its products are non-exclusive and it generates diseconomies of search.
This is because in that case all the intermediarys products can be acquired elsewhere
at a lower search cost. On the other hand, part (ii) shows that all consumers visit the
intermediary when it generates su¢ ciently strong economies of search.
Part (iii) shows that in other cases consumers follow a cut-o¤ strategy, and search the
intermediary provided their search cost is su¢ ciently low. Intuitively, the advantage of
shopping at the intermediary is that it stocks some exclusive products and/or has a better
search technology, while the disadvantage is having to buy some low-v products. Con-
sumers with low s would like to buy most products anyway and so the latter disadvantage
is small.27
Finally, notice that s^ in (12) degenerates to the average surplus v^ dened in (2) if all
stocked products are exclusive and h(m) = m. We use a di¤erent notation in this general
case to emphasize that the threshold is now no longer the simple average surplus of the
products sold at the intermediary.
4.2 Optimal product range
Given the monopoly pricing result in Lemma 1 and the consumer search rule in Lemma
3, the intermediarys prot when it chooses a stocking policy q is
(q) =
Z
v<s^
q[F (s^)  F (v)]dG+
Z
v>s^
qE[F (s^)  F (v)]dG : (13)
Firstly, the intermediary earns  [F (s^)  F (v)] > 0 on products with v < s^ irrespective
of whether they are stocked exclusively or non-exclusively (i.e. only q = qE + qNE mat-
ters). Intuitively, even under non-exclusivity the manufacturer makes zero direct sales,
because consumers with s < s^ buy its product from the intermediary and consumers with
s  s^ are not willing to search it. Hence the intermediary earns variable prot F (s^)
and pays the manufacturer its outside option F (v). Secondly, the intermediary earns
 [F (s^)  F (v)] < 0 from stocking products with v > s^ exclusively, and the explanation
is the same as in the simple case. Lastly, the intermediary earns zero prot from stocking
products with v > s^ non-exclusively. The reason is that when a manufacturer signs a
non-exclusive contract, consumers with s < s^ switch and buy its product from the inter-
mediary, but consumers with s 2 (s^; v) continue to buy direct. Hence the intermediary
only needs to compensate the manufacturer by F (s^) which equals its own revenue from
27Notice that consumer search behavior is a¤ected only by the measure (and not the identity) of non-
exclusive products with v > s^. This is because consumers with s < s^ would buy these products anyway,
so making them available at the intermediary only changes the search cost associated with buying them.
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selling that product. Note that although the intermediary breaks even on these products,
it may stock them in order to inuence consumer search behavior.
The following lemma provides a simple su¢ cient condition under which the interme-
diary is guaranteed to earn strictly positive prot.
Lemma 4 The intermediary stocks a strictly positive measure of products and earns a
strictly positive prot if there exists an ~m 2 (0; m) such that h ( ~m)  ~m.
We now characterize the optimal product selection when the intermediary can prof-
itably exist with s^ > 0. The intermediary wishes to maximize its prot from equation
(13) given the space limit m  1, where s^ was dened earlier in Lemma 3. When s^ 2 (0; s]
we know that s^ satises equation (12), which we can rewrite asZ
v<s^
qvdG+
Z
v>s^
(qEv + qNE s^)dG  h(m)s^ = 0 ; (14)
where m denotes the measure of products stocked by the intermediary and satises
m =
Z
qdG : (15)
The stocking space constraint can be written as
m  m : (16)
It is again convenient to solve the intermediarys problem using the Lagrangian method,
treating (14)-(16) as constraints. Let ,  and  be their respective Lagrange multipliers
(and note that  = 0 if s^ > s because in that case the constraint (14) does not apply).
After some manipulations we can write the (Kuhn-Tucker) Lagrange function as
L =
Z
v<s^
q f [F (s^)  F (v)] + v   g dG
+
Z
v>s^
fqE [ [F (s^)  F (v)] + v   ] + qNE (s^  )g dG
 s^h(m) + m+ ( m m) : (17)
It is again useful to decompose the Lagrange function into direct and indirect e¤ects of
stocking product (; v). The direct e¤ect is the prot generated by the product: recall
from earlier that it is zero if the product is non-exclusive and v > s^, and otherwise equals
 [F (s^)  F (v)]. The indirect e¤ect is the change in prots from other products due to
changes in consumer search behavior: it equals s^  if the product is non-exclusive and
v > s^, and otherwise is v . Since the integrands are again linear in stocking variables,
we have the following characterization of the optimal product selection:
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Proposition 2 Suppose the intermediary earns a strictly positive prot (e.g. the condi-
tion in Lemma 4 is satised). The optimal product selection is as follows (with s^ > 0,
  0 and   0 dened in the proof):
(i) Products with v < s^ are stocked if and only if
    v
F (s^)  F (v) ; (18)
and it does not matter whether these products are exclusive or not.
(ii) Products with v > s^ are stocked exclusively if and only if
  maxfs^; g   v
F (s^)  F (v) : (19)
Of the other products with v > s^: if s^ >  all of them are stocked non-exclusively, if
s^ =  some of them are stocked non-exclusively, and if s^ <  none of them are stocked.
As in the simple case, the intermediary stocks some high-v and low- products ex-
clusively to attract consumers, and some low-v and high- products to generate prots.
An important di¤erence is that now the intermediary may also stock high-v and high-
products non-exclusively.28 Whether or not that happens depends on the sign of the in-
direct e¤ect s^  .29 In general it appears hard to nd primitive conditions for the sign
of s^  , but we have the following useful observation:
Corollary 1 If the space constraint is not binding (m < m) in the optimal product se-
lection, then  = s^h0 (m). Hence in the region of v > s^, all products are stocked if
h0 (m) < 1, but only low- products are stocked (exclusively) if h0 (m) > 1.
Corollary 1 shows that in an interesting special case of the model, when the interme-
diary generates (marginal) diseconomies of search its optimal product selection has two
negatively correlated regions in the (; v) space (as in the simple case).30
According to Proposition 2 the intermediary is indi¤erent about stocking products
with v < s^ exclusively or non-exclusively. (This is because exclusivity has no e¤ect on
either the direct prot in equation (13) or on consumer search behavior in Lemma 3). One
way to break this indi¤erence is to introduce some small-demand consumers who never
28Another subtler di¤erence is that unlike in the simple case it is possible that s^ < v (when v > 0 and
diseconomies of search are strong) or s^ > v (when economies of search are strong). In these cases only
one part of Proposition 2 is relevant.
29If s^    = 0 the intermediary is indi¤erent about which of these non-exclusive products to stock
(and the equation s^   = 0 pins down their measure). In this case the optimal selection is not unique.
30These two regions are also disconnected, because given h0 (m) > 1, as v ! s^ the thresholds in (18)
and (19) tend respectively to 1 and  1. Intuitively products with v  s^ generate only a small direct
prot or loss, so their negative e¤ect on consumersincentives to search the intermediary dominates.
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visit the intermediary. In that case the intermediary strictly prefers to stock products
with v < s^ non-exclusively, because it reduces the compensation paid to manufacturers.
Therefore in subsequent analysis we interpret products with v < s^ as being non-exclusive.
We now illustrate the optimal product selection using some examples. First, we il-
lustrate how the intermediarys search technology a¤ects its product selection. Figure
2 considers an example with F (s) = s and G(; v) = v and no space constraint (i.e.
m = 1).31 The search technology is h(m) = 1:2m in part (a), h(m) = m in part (b), and
h (m) = 0:8m in part (c). Consistent with Corollary 1, when h (m) = 1:2m only the low-
products with v > s^ are stocked (exclusively), whereas when h (m) = 0:8m all products
with v > s^ are stocked. (When h (m) = m the intermediary is indi¤erent about stocking
each product in [0:5; 1]2 non-exclusively. The gure depicts the case where the interme-
diary stocks all these products.) Comparing across the three cases, as the intermediarys
search technology becomes more e¢ cient it stocks more products (m increases from 0:29
to 0:75 and then to 0:76) but a smaller proportion of them are exclusive (the percentage
decreases from 50% to 33% and then to 27%). Intuitively, the intermediary relies less
on exclusive products to attract consumers when it already helps to reduce their search
costs.
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(c) h(m) = 0:8m
Figure 2: Optimal product range and search technology
Second, we illustrate how the space limit m a¤ects product selection. Figure 3 con-
siders an example with F (s) = s and G(; v) = v (as above), and also h (m) = 0:4
such that the cost of visiting the intermediary is independent of its size. In this exam-
ple marginal economies of search are so strong that the intermediary always uses all its
stocking space. In part (a) m = 0:3 and the optimal solution has s^    < 0, hence
the intermediary stocks products in two negatively correlated and disconnected regions.
31This example with h(m) = a+ bm can be fully solved. A su¢ cient condition for the intermediary to
exist is a+ b  3=2, which is weaker than the condition given in Lemma 4.
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In part (b) m = 0:46 and the optimal solution has s^    = 0, hence the intermediary
stocks some but not all of the products in the top-right corner non-exclusively. (As dis-
cussed in footnote 29, when s^    = 0 the optimal solution in the top-right corner is
not unique. In particular, only the measure of products that are stocked non-exclusively
can be determined. Conditional on stocking the correct measure of products, the inter-
mediary is indi¤erent over exactly which products in the top-right corner to stock. The
gure depicts the case where the intermediary stocks those with the highest v.) In part
(c) m = 0:5 and the optimal solution has s^    > 0, hence all products with v > s^
are stocked.32 Comparing across the three cases, as the intermediary becomes able to
stock more products, it attracts more consumers (s^ increases from 0:32 to 0:7 and then to
0:81) but stocks proportionately fewer exclusive products (the percentage decreases from
50% to 45:6% and then to 30:5%), while sales outside the intermediary fall (from 0:37 to
0:22, and then to 0:175). Notice that qualitatively the e¤ect of a better search technology
(Figure 2) and larger space limit (Figure 3) are the same.
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(c) m = 0:5
Figure 3: Optimal product range and stocking space constraint
4.3 Socially optimal product range
We now briey study the socially optimal product range. Suppose a social planner wishes
to maximize total welfare, and it can choose the stocking policy q but has no direct control
over rm pricing or how consumers search. This problem can be solved in a similar way
to the intermediarys. We therefore report the main result here and relegate the details
to the online appendix.
32The product selection is similar to Figure 3(a) for m below around 0:454, similar to Figure 3(b) for
m between around 0:454 and 0:463, and similar to Figure 3(c) for m between around 0:463 and 0:65.
When m exceeds around 0:65 the intermediarys size and strong economies of search enable it to attract
all consumers, none of its products are exclusive, and only low-v and low- manufacturers make direct
sales.
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Proposition 3 A su¢ cient condition for the socially optimal stocking policy to have
m > 0 is that h ( ~m)  ~m for some ~m 2 (0; m). The socially optimal policy is characterized
as follows (with s^ > 0,   0 and   0 dened in the proof):
(i) Products with v < s^ are stocked if and only if
 + v    v  
R v
0
sdF (s)
F (s^)  F (v) ; (20)
and it does not matter whether they are exclusive or not.
(ii) Products with v > s^ are stocked exclusively if and only if
 + v  maxf; s^+
R s^
0
sdF (s)g   v   R v
0
sdF (s)
F (s^)  F (v) : (21)
Of the other products with v > s^: if s^ +
R s^
0
sdF (s) >  all of them are stocked non-
exclusively, if s^ +
R s^
0
sdF (s) =  some of them are stocked non-exclusively, and if s^ +R s^
0
sdF (s) <  none of them are stocked.
The welfare-optimal stocking policy is qualitatively the same as the one used by the
intermediary. Firstly, exclusive products with v > s^ are again chosen to have low , and
products with v < s^ are chosen to have high . Intuitively this is because, as we noted
earlier, consumers do not take into account sellersprot, and therefore search (and buy)
too little from a welfare perspective. Demand for a product with v > s^ is further reduced
when it is sold exclusively by the intermediary, but conversely demand for a product with
v < s^ is increased when it is sold by the intermediary. Choosing the former products
to have low  minimizes the additional welfare loss, and choosing the latter to have a
high  maximizes the welfare gains. Secondly, and mirroring Corollary 1 from earlier, we
can show that when the stocking constraint is slack at the optimum all products with
v > s^ are stocked if h0(m) < 1, but only those with low  are stocked (exclusively) if
h0(m) > 1. Intuitively, when the intermediary adds some non-exclusive products with
v > s^ all the consumers with s < s^ will switch their purchases of those products away
from manufacturers towards the intermediary, and their total search cost falls if h0 (m) < 1
but increases if h0 (m) > 1.
We would now like to compare the stocking policies chosen by the intermediary and
social planner. Unfortunately this is hard to do analytically, because in general (s^; ; )
di¤er across the two solutions and are determined by a complex system of equations.
Intuitively though, one would expect the social planner to stock fewer high-v products
exclusively since this harms consumers that do not search the intermediary. Similarly,
if economies of search are not too strong, one would expect the social planner to stock
fewer low-v products because consumers who search the intermediary end up buying
them even though they provide little surplus. We conrm this intuition using our running
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example with G(; v) = v and F (s) = s. Suppose there is no stocking space constraint.
Figure 4(a) plots the socially optimal product range for the case h (m) = 1:2m. Since the
intermediary has diseconomies of search, this product range is nowmuch smaller than (and
is a subset of) that in Figure 2(a). Figure 4(b) plots the socially optimal product range
for the case h (m) = m. It turns out that in this case (s^; ; ) are the same as in Figure
2(b). The social planners product range is also a strict subset of the intermediarys, and
it stocks fewer products exclusively. Figure 4(c) plots the socially optimal product range
for the case h (m) = 0:8m. Here (s^; ; ) di¤er from Figure 2(c), and the social planners
selection is not a subset of the intermediarys. Nevertheless the intermediary again stocks
fewer products overall and also fewer products exclusively.
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Figure 4: Socially optimal product range
Finally, even though our results suggest that the intermediary stocks too many ex-
clusive products, a complete ban on exclusivity is not necessarily welfare enhancing. For
example in the simple case with h (m) = m, a ban on exclusivity prevents the intermediary
from existing and so strictly reduces total welfare.
5 Two Applications
We now apply our framework to examine the optimal design of a shopping mall (which
acts as a platform and does not directly set prices) and the e¤ect of DTC sales on retail
markets. Here in each application we lay out various theoretical predictions and then
document relevant empirical evidence in the following section of the paper.
5.1 Shopping malls
Suppose there is a unit mass of sellers each of which can either join a shopping mall and/or
set up its own independent shop in the same area. The mall can host up to a measure m
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of sellers, and charges each of them a xed fee. Consumers pay n s to search a measure
n of independent shops and h (m)  s to search a mall which contains a measure m of
shops. The timing is exactly as in Section 4 except that now the mall is a platform and
therefore individual sellers set prices.
Our earlier analysis applies straightforwardly. Firstly, it is easy to see that seller i
should charge pmi wherever it sells its product. (We do not even need Lemma 1.) Hence
our (; v) representation remains valid. Secondly, consumers search the mall if and only if
s < s^ where s^ was dened earlier in Lemma 3. Thirdly, sales of a product (; v) at the mall
generate a gross prot of F (s^). Therefore a seller with v < s^ will pay  [F (s^)  F (v)] to
join the mall, whilst a seller with v > s^ is willing to join the mall for free if it also maintains
an independent store elsewhere, but must be paid  [F (v)  F (s^)] to exclusively join the
mall. Consequently the mall owners prot is the same as in equation (13).
The optimal mix of stores within the mall is exactly as in Proposition 2. Using some
terminology from existing literature, we can interpret sellers with v > s^ who are exclusive
to the mall as anchor stores. According to our model, the mall owner should subsidize
anchor stores to encourage them to join. This is worthwhile because their presence attracts
more consumers (i.e. increases s^), which allows the mall to charge a higher fee to other
non-anchorstores.
5.2 Direct-to-consumer sales
We argued in the introduction that it has become increasingly easy for manufacturers to
sell direct to consumers. Our framework can be extended to look at the consequences of
easier DTC sales. To this end consider the general case from Section 4, but now index
products by (; v; ) where  > 0 represents how easy it is for consumers to buy direct
from the products manufacturer. Specically, a consumer with unit search cost s, if she
visits a measure n of manufacturers with DTC index , incurs a total search cost n s.
Importantly we assume that  can di¤er across products (so that direct sales are easier
for products with a lower ), and we say that all products with a common  belong to the
same sector. We let G(; v; ) be the joint distribution over the product space, and [; ]
be the support of . We also assume that conditional on  the (; v) space is compact
and convex, and v  s to avoid corner solutions.
We start by characterizing the intermediarys optimal product selection. We then
consider what happens as DTC sales become easier in certain sectors. All the omitted
details in this section can be found in the online appendix.
5.2.1 Optimal stocking policy
An important di¤erence with the baseline model is that if the manufacturer of a product
(; v; ) only sells direct to consumers, it sells to all consumers for whom v > s. Hence
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the manufacturers outside option is F (v=). As one would expect this outside option
is higher when  is lower i.e. when direct sales are easier. This already suggests that the
intermediary will have less incentive to carry products which are easier to sell direct.
Analysis of consumer search and intermediary prot closely follows that from Section
4. Consumers visit the intermediary if and only if their search cost is below a threshold
s^ which is dened in a similar way to in Lemma 3 from earlier. The intermediary earns
a positive prot on products with v < s^ and exclusivity does not matter; for products
with v > s^ it breaks even when stocking non-exclusively, and makes negative prot
when stocking exclusively.33 We then obtain the following characterization of the optimal
stocking policy:
Proposition 4 The optimal stocking policy is characterized as follows (with s^ > 0,   0
and   0 dened in the proof):
(i) Products with v < s^ are stocked if and only if
    v
F (s^)  F (v

)
; (22)
and it does not matter whether these products are exclusive or not.
(ii) Products with v > s^ are stocked exclusively if and only if
  maxfs^; g   v
F (s^)  F (v

)
: (23)
Of the other products with v > s^: if s^    > 0 they are stocked non-exclusively, if
s^ =  some of them are stocked non-exclusively, and if s^    < 0 none of them are
stocked.
Given a particular  the conditions for whether and how a product is stocked are similar
to those from the general case. Using Proposition 4 we can derive two implications for
how the stocking policy di¤ers across sectors. The rst is:
Corollary 2 Consider products with the same (; v). If the intermediary stocks (exclu-
sively or non-exclusively) one in sector 0, then it also stocks all those in sectors  > 0.
Corollary 2 further implies that in the special case where the distribution of  is inde-
pendent of (; v) then more products are stocked by the intermediary in higher- sectors.
One reason (as alluded to above) is that manufacturers with higher- products have a
worse outside option and so are cheaper for the intermediary to contract with. Another
reason is that the indirect benet to the intermediary of stocking higher- products is also
higher, because by stocking these products the intermediary saves consumers who visit it
more search costs. A second implication is the following:
33Closely following Lemma 4 we can also show that a su¢ cient condition for the intermediary to
protably exist is that there is a positive measure of  for which h( ~m)   ~m for some ~m 2 (0; m).
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Corollary 3 Suppose m < m at the optimum and consider products with s^ 2 (v; v).
(i) Among those with  < h0 (m) none are stocked for v in a neighborhood of s^, and none
with v > s^ are stocked non-exclusively. That is, in sectors where DTC sales are relatively
easy, the intermediary only stocks products in two disconnected and negatively-correlated
regions.
(ii) Among those with  > h0 (m) all are stocked for v in a neighborhood of s^, and all
with v > s^ are stocked. That is, in sectors where DTC sales are relatively hard, the
intermediarys product range is a connected set which includes all high-v products.
Corollary 3 suggests that in an interesting special case of the model, product selection
is more polarized in sectors where DTC is easier. Intuitively, the intermediary nds
it relatively expensive to stock products with  < h0 (m) and also generates search dis-
economies on them. Hence it stocks exclusively a small measure of high-v and low-
products which are very successful in attracting consumers, and stocks a small measure
of low-v and high- products which are particularly protable. On the other hand, the
intermediary nds it relatively cheap to stock products with  > h0 (m) and also generates
search economies on them. Hence the optimal product selection is very di¤erent.34
5.2.2 Changes in the ease of DTC sales
We now consider the e¤ect of improvements in technology which make DTC sales easier.
Formally, DTC sales become easier when for each sector  the DTC sales cost index
for product (; v; ) decreases to (; ; v)  , with a strict inequality for a positive
measure of sectors.35 We assume throughout that the cost of visiting the intermediary
is unchanged, which is plausible when the intermediary is an o­ ine retailer such as a
supermarket or department store.
We begin with the following straightforward result:
Corollary 4 When DTC sales become easier, manufacturer prot increases while the
intermediarys prot decreases.
Manufacturers clearly benet since they always earn their outside option F (v=),
and this strictly increases for any manufacturer whose product becomes strictly easier
34In the limit case where  !1 for all products (and so DTC sales are impossible), the intermediary
stocks products with   (  v)=F (s^), i.e. those with high  and high v. Intuitively the intermediary
does not need to compensate manufacturers beyond their marginal cost, and so carries products with
high v to attract consumers and high  to maximize variable prots.
35Here we implicitly assume that DTC sales become easier for exogenous reasons e.g. due to the
development of online marketplaces. In practice manufacturers can also invest in direct channels. Fixing
the investment cost, and under some regularity conditions, manufacturers with high-v and high- products
are more likely to invest i.e.  (;; v) falls more for those products.
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to sell direct. On the other hand the intermediary is made worse o¤. It is easy to see
that if the intermediary does not change its stocking policy it becomes worse o¤, both
because it has to compensate manufacturers more, and because easier DTC sales leads
to a reduction in the measure of consumers that use the intermediary; Corollary 4 then
shows that the intermediary is still worse o¤ even after it adjusts its stocking policy.
We now discuss in more detail how the intermediary should adjust its stocking policy
as DTC sales become easier. Unfortunately in general it is impossible to provide analytical
results. Therefore we use an example to illustrate the main insight. Suppose that m =
1, h(m) = m, (; v) is on [0; 1]2 uniformly, F (s) = s=2 with support [0; 2],36 and 
has a binary distribution, independent of (; v), with Pr( = 1=2) = z and Pr( =
3=2) = 1   z, where z 2 [0; 1]. We vary the proportion z of products for which DTC
sales are easy. As z increases more products fall in the low- sector, and therefore the
intermediary carries fewer products as described in Figure 5(a), but a higher proportion
of them are exclusive as described in Figure 5(b). Intuitively, when it becomes easier to
sell certain products direct, their manufacturers must be compensated more and so it is
less protable for the intermediary to still carry them. At the same time, however, easier
direct sales reduce consumersneed to search the intermediary, and so the intermediary
relies more on product exclusivity to remain attractive. Figure 5(c) then plots the total
measure of consumers buying direct (the increasing dashed curve), the total measure of
consumers buying from the intermediary multiplied by the measure of products it stocks
(the decreasing dashed curve), as well as the sum of these two things (the increasing solid
curve). As expected, the plot suggests that easier DTC sales lead to an expansion of total
sales but also diversion away from the intermediary towards the manufacturers.37
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Figure 5: The impact of easier DTC sales
36The support of s ensures that v  s in this example, and so avoids corner solutions.
37The plot only imperfectly capture sales however, because di¤erent products in the (; v; ) space have
di¤erent demands and so the amount bought di¤ers.
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Finally, we also point out some other interesting implications that come out of the
above example. The rst implication is that easier DTC sales in some sectors can have
spillovers on other sectors. Specically, we nd that as z increases the intermediary
attracts fewer consumers i.e. s^ decreases. (Intuitively easier direct sales make the inter-
mediarys one-stop shopping service less attractive to consumers.) This implies that even
in sectors where the DTC technology does not change, more consumers buy non-exclusive
high-v and high- products direct rather than via the intermediary. The second impli-
cation is that if the intermediary does not adjust its product selection, easier DTC sales
may force it to close down entirely. For instance, if in the above example z increases from
1=5 to 4=5 but the intermediary does not change its stocking policy then it will make a
loss of  0:049, whereas if it reoptimizes it will make positive prot.38
6 Empirical Evidence
In this section we document some evidence for the main economic forces in our model
and the main predictions.
6.1 Cross-product e¤ects
As we have already discussed, indirect or cross-producte¤ects play an important role in
our model. Here we o¤er some evidence of their practical relevance.
Firstly, some studies have documented signicant cross-category spillovers at the retail
level. For example, Sen et al (2013) estimate that when a supermarket adds a gas station
total trips to the store increase by 14%-15%, and gas-buyers spend 7.7%-9.3% more on
groceries. They also argue that the resulting prot increase on groceries outweighs that
from gas, since the former has signicantly higher prot margins.39 (Thus in the spirit
of our model we might interpret gas as a low- but high-v product, and groceries overall
as a high- product.) Meanwhile Gielens et al (2014) estimate the impact of a Dutch
supermarket exclusively stocking ve national brands. They nd that in three of those
cases the (absolute) cross-category sales e¤ect dominates the own-category sales e¤ect by
a signicant amount.
Secondly, and related, our model shows that some categories should be used to attract
consumers and others to generate prot. Consistent with this, Briesch et al (2013) state
38The impact of DTC sales on industry prot, consumer surplus and total welfare is di¢ cult to inves-
tigate analytically. In the above example, when z increases from 1=5 to 4=5, all three increase.
39Sen et al (2013) also point out in their footnote 3 that conversations with managers at the retailer
indicated that there was no e¤ort to position gasoline as a loss-leader or undercut the prices of nearby
gas stations, and so the cross-category e¤ect here is unlikely to be part of a usual loss-leader pricing
strategy.
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that A fundamental tenet of category management is that individual categories play
di¤erent roles. They also estimate the utility that consumers get from di¤erent categories
and nd it to be very heterogeneous (see their Table 8), labeling those with highest utility
as destination categories(which in our model could be interpreted as having high v).
In a similar spirit, Kök et al (2015) argue that a retailer like Best Buy might o¤er more
variety in certain categories than would be optimal in isolation, so as to attract more
consumers and increase sales from other categories. Similarly Fisher and Vaidyanathan
(2012) give the example of a supermarket which dropped low-selling (and, one might infer,
low-prot) products and then promptly lost a large number of customers and hence sales
of other protable goods.
Finally, evidence from shopping mall contracts demonstrates the importance of cross-
seller e¤ects. Recall Section 5 where we applied our framework to mall design. Consistent
with our discussion there, Gould et al (2005) show that adding more anchor storesto
a mall increases both the sales and rents paid by non-anchor stores. (Thus, again in
the spirit of the model, we might interpret anchor stores as high-v sellers and non-anchor
stores as low-v sellers.) Their results also suggest that anchor stores are subsidized to join
the mall in anticipation of these positive spillovers. Specically, they document that 73%
of anchor stores pay no rent while others pay substantially reduced rents ($4.13 vs $29.37
per square foot), while at the same time the mall often pays for things like development
and maintenance costs.
6.2 Product exclusivity
As we demonstrated in the Introduction, exclusivity is increasingly important in retail
markets. Here we o¤er some evidence in favor of the trade-o¤s generated by exclusivity in
our model, and o¤er some more speculative evidence concerning our models predictions
about which (and how many) products should be o¤ered exclusively.
In our model, a manufacturer typically sells fewer units if it accepts an exclusive
contract. However when used optimally, exclusivity brings more consumers to the inter-
mediary and raises joint bilateral prot. Gielens et al (2014) study empirically the e¤ects
of ve product exclusivity arrangements in a Dutch supermarket. They nd that in each
case the exclusivity arrangement benets the retailer through higher store-wide sales, and
that in all but one case harms the manufacturer through lower total sales. They also nd
that in four out of the ve cases joint prot is increased by the arrangement.
Our model also makes some predictions about which products should be sold exclu-
sively, and when the intermediarys product range should contain more exclusive products.
Unfortunately we are not aware of any empirical research that directly speaks to these
predictions. What does seem to be true is that traditionally exclusivity was associated
only with luxury goods, whereas it is increasingly being used in a wide variety of cate-
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gories including in groceries. (See, e.g., Gielens et al (2014) and Upshaw et al (2017).) We
hope that our (; v) framework o¤ers a new way to think about exclusivity. According
to our model, what matters for whether a product should be sold exclusively is its ability
to attract consumers and its prot margin when sold alone, instead of whether it is a
necessity or a luxury good.
One type of exclusive product which has been studied in the literature is private labels.
Private labels are increasingly high-quality and are often argued to increase store tra¢ c,40
and so play the same role as exclusive products in our model. Our model suggests that
exclusive products should have high-v and low-, and as we discuss in more detail in
Section 7.1 below, this suggests they should have higher cost pass-through. Consistent
with this, Hong and Li (2017) nd that private labels have higher pass-through. (However
this should be interpreted with caution since pass-through rates depend on many factors.)
Our model also suggests that smaller retailers should stock proportionately more exclusive
products. Consistent with this, some successful small retailers like Trader Joes have very
large high-quality private label shares. (Trader Joes stocks around 4000 items compared
to 50000 at a typical grocery store, and 80% of them are private label. See Sorescu et
al (2011).) Along the same lines, Briesch et al (2013) present some descriptive statistics
showing that Walmart (a mass merchandiser) has a lower level of private labels and higher
level of national brands compared to four smaller supermarkets.
6.3 Retail technology and stocking space
As pointed out by Hortaçsu and Syverson (2015), starting in the late 1990s improvements
in IT and logistics led to a rapid increase in the number of very large retailers such as
warehouse clubs and supercenters. At the same time, sales at smaller traditional retailers
decreased. The comparative static exercise with respect to m (as in the example in Figure
3) o¤ers a convenient way to think through these developments.41 Specically, imagine
that better technology enables the intermediary to better manage and so stock more
products, and suppose we interpret direct sales more broadly as sales by small specialist
retailers. The example in Figure 3 suggests that sales by specialist retailers do indeed fall
as m increases, because consumers switch their purchases towards the intermediary. A
novel feature is that this occurs even though the intermediary in our model does not use
aggressive pricing strategies against the smaller competitors - the result is driven purely
by consumer search frictions and the improvement in the intermediarys retail technology.
40See, e.g., https://bit.ly/2vEzVNq.
41We thank the referee for pointing out this application.
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6.4 DTC sales
In Section 5 we used our framework to study how the retail landscape changes as DTC
sales become easier. Traditionally direct channels were rare, except in a few sectors like
apparel and high-end technology (Oliver Wyman, 2018). However, in recent years, direct
channels have appeared for a wide variety of products. According to a report by the
OECD (2019), growth in e-commerce has prompted a concomitant expansion into the
online retail sphere by manufacturers, including many manufacturers without an equiv-
alent brick-and-mortar retail presence.One reason is that the Internet directly reduces
consumer search costs, and makes it easier and cheaper for manufacturers to advertise
their products. Another reason is that the Internet allows manufacturers to sell to con-
sumers without making large investments (European Commission, 2017). Moreover if we
interpret the search frictions more broadly to include delivery waiting times, improve-
ments in distribution networks also make direct sales easier. Nevertheless some products
are easier to sell direct than others. For example, selling direct is easier when products are
standardized and easy to deliver, as is the case for traditional packaged goods, software,
and nancial and travel services. One contribution of our model is to show that whether
a particular product should be sold direct depends not only on the ease of direct sales ,
but also on cost and demand factors as reected in its (; v) value.
We showed earlier that as DTC sales become easier, the market expands and sales are
diverted away from the intermediary. Consistent with this, Duch-Brown et al (2017) esti-
mate that the e-commerce channel reduced sales of portable media players at traditional
retailers in Europe by 13.2%, but raised overall sales by 5.3%. (They provide similar
evidence for digital cameras and portable computers). Unfortunately it is unclear what
proportion of online sales in their study are direct or by specialist retailers. However
other evidence of the expansion and diversion e¤ects comes from Aguirregabiria et als
(2016) study of the Ontario liquor market, where consumers can buy wine either from
two specialist outlets (selling local wines) or from a large (generalist) liquor shop. They
estimate that if the specialist wine stores were to close, the liquor shop would sell more
wine yet total wine sales would fall.
Our model also suggests that as DTC sales become easier, the intermediary should
become smaller but stock proportionally more exclusive products so as to remain attrac-
tive to consumers. We are not aware of any formal empirical evidence on the link between
DTC sales and product selection. However, anecdotal evidence seems consistent with the
models prediction. According to a World Economic Forum report (2017), newly opened
supermarkets are 18% smaller than existing ones, and newly opened mass merchandise
stores are typically half as large as existing ones. Many commentators have also empha-
sized that in order to succeed retailers cannot a¤ord to be just one-stop shops, and
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should have more exclusive brands.42 To this end, prominent retailers such as Macys and
Target have been simultaneously shrinking their assortments and adding more exclusive
products.43
Finally, our model also suggests that easier DTC sales make it harder for the interme-
diary to attract customers and also reduces its protability. Again we are not aware of
formal empirical evidence about this impact of DTC. However some commentators have
linked aggressive pursuit of DTC sales by manufacturers such as Nike to the closure of
sports retailers like Bostons City Sports, and declines in the share price of others such
as Foot Locker and Dicks. Consistent with our model, they have also argued that Dicks
has performed better than expected due to increased usage of private brands and other
exclusively stocked products.44
7 Discussion and Extensions
In this section we rst discuss the foundation of the (; v) product space, and then present
two extensions: one with demand heterogeneity, and the other with upstream competition
where each product has multiple varieties supplied by di¤erent manufacturers.
7.1 Foundation and interpretation of the (; v) product space
We now explain how to construct the (; v) space and interpret di¤erent points within
it. Suppose that demand for product i can be written as Qi (pi)  Q (pi; i) where i
is a vector of demand parameters. Using the denitions introduced in equation (1), one
can calculate i = (i; ci) and vi = v(i; ci), and then derive the (; v) space from the
parameter space (; c).45
We now introduce a class of demand functions to illustrate how di¤erent points in the
(; v) space can be interpreted in terms of the size and shape of demand. Suppose that
42See, e.g., https://bit.ly/2VJyjk4 and https://bit.ly/2DOPVkk.
43See, e.g., https://bit.ly/2IjQ82U and https://on.wsj.com/2B2oCSq for the product strategy adjust-
ment of Macys and https://on.wsj.com/2TojcfC for Target.
44See references in footnote 5 for Bostons City Sports, as well as https://bit.ly/2JGUZee for discussion
of Foot Locker and Dicks.
45If products di¤er in exactly two parameters, it is possible to have a one-to-one correspondence between
the parameter space and the (; v) space. However if products di¤er in more than two parameters,
generically each point in the (; v) space represents a continuum of di¤erent products. We can then let
qE (; v) and qNE (; v) denote respectively the fraction of exclusive and non-exclusive products at point
(; v). Since our objective functions are linear in stocking policy variables, the solution is bang-bang with
qE (; v) ; qNE (; v) 2 f0; 1g and so our analysis is unchanged.
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product i has a constant-curvature demand function
Qi (pi) = ai

1  1  i
2  ipi
 1
1 i
;
where ai > 0 is the scale and i 2 ( 1; 2) is the curvature of demand. (Curvature is
dened as the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand.) This is a rich class which includes
concave demand when i < 0, linear demand when i = 0, and convex demand when
i > 0. It is straightforward to show that provided marginal cost is not too large, the
monopoly price for product i is pmi = 1+
ci
2 i , and i and vi are both increasing in ai and
decreasing in ci, and moreover i=vi = 2  i. (Intuitively a lower i means that demand
is more concave and rectangular-shaped, and hence the rm can extract a greater share
of the available surplus.46) Consequently each product in (; v) space lies on a ray from
the origin, where i determines the slope of the ray and (ai; ci) determines how far the
product is along the ray. Notice also that in this example the rate of cost pass-through
equals 1= (2  i). Our model therefore suggests that for this particular demand class,
products with large and convex demands (so high pass-through rates) should be stocked
exclusively to attract consumers to visit, while products with large and concave demands
(so low pass-through rates) should be stocked non-exclusively as prot generators.
7.2 Demand heterogeneity
In our baseline model consumers di¤er in their search costs and can end up purchasing
di¤erent products. (As explained in discussion (iii) in Section 2.1, the baseline model also
permits an interpretation where consumers have unit demand but heterogeneous valua-
tions for each product.) In this section we introduce some additional demand heterogene-
ity and show that the main insights concerning product selection remain unchanged, as
long as there are no extra price e¤ects caused by the new demand heterogeneity. Suppose
there are n di¤erent types of consumer, and let j > 0 denote the probability of being
type j = 1; : : : ; n. A consumer of type j demands an amount i;jQi (pi) of good i when
faced with a price pi, where i;j  0 is independent of price.47 (One example would be
the case where i;j 2 f0; 1g, and di¤erent types of consumer want di¤erent subsets of
the products. Another example would be the case where i;j  j but j varies across
types, such that some consumers have larger demands for everything than others.) For
simplicity here we focus on the simple case as in Section 3, and assume that a consumers
46This insight holds beyond the particular demand class studied here. Anderson and Renault (2003)
and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that in general more concavedemands have a higher i=vi ratio.
47A more general approach would be to assume that type j has demand Qi(pi; j) for product i.
However, because the intermediary and manufacturer might be searched by di¤erent consumer types,
they would not necessarily have the same monopoly price, and so we would not be able to use the (; v)
approach. We thank the referee for encouraging us to think more about this.
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unit search cost s is independent of her demand type. (The general case is reported in a
separate supplementary document.)
Given our specication of demand heterogeneity, the monopoly price for good i is
independent of which (and how many) consumer types are served. Hence we can again
represent products as points in a two-dimensional (; v) space, 
. Moreover, slightly
abusing notation, we can also dene a measurable function j (; v) such that when
a consumer of type j buys the product (; v) at its monopoly price, she gets surplus
j (; v) v and generates gross prot j (; v). To avoid corner solutions we assume
that j (; v) v < s for all j and (; v) 2 
.
Suppose the intermediary uses a stocking policy q (; v). Closely following our earlier
analysis, type j consumers will search a manufacturer who sells direct if and only if
s  j (; v) v, and will search the intermediary if and only if s < v^j where
v^j =
R


q (; v)j (; v) vdGR


q (; v) dG
(24)
is the average surplus of the products sold at the intermediary for type j consumers. The
intermediary must therefore pay a manufacturer
Pn
j=1 jj (; v)F (j (; v) v) in order
to stock its product. The intermediarys total prot is thenZ


q (; v) f
nX
j=1
jj (; v) [F (v^j)  F (j (; v) v)]gdG : (25)
To keep the exposition clean we henceforth drop the dependence of q and j on (; v).
The intermediary chooses a stocking policy function to maximize its prot (25) subject
to the denition of v^j in equation (24). The Lagrangian function is
L =
Z


qf
nX
j=1
jj [F (v^j)  F (jv)]| {z }
Direct e¤ect
+
nX
j=1
j (jv   v^j)| {z }g
Indirect e¤ect
dG ; (26)
where j  0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier for equation (24). As usual we can decom-
pose the intermediarys value of stocking a product into the direct prot it earns, and the
indirect e¤ect it has on the protability of other products via consumerssearch decisions.
Similar to our earlier analysis, for any given consumer type with j > 0 and v^j > 0 the
direct and indirect e¤ects of stocking a product have opposite signs. However as is clear
from (26), it is possible that after summing over all types, the direct and indirect e¤ects
actually have the same sign. It is therefore possible that by stocking a product the inter-
mediary earns a direct prot and also increases its total prot from other products (and
vice versa). This is the main di¤erence caused by demand heterogeneity.
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We now characterize the intermediarys optimal stocking policy.48 It is clear from (26)
that xing v^ = (v^1; : : : ; v^n) and  = (1; : : : ; n), a product (; v) is stocked if either
nX
j=1
jj [F (v^j)  F (jv)] > 0 and  
Pn
j=1 j (v^j   jv)Pn
j=1 jj [F (v^j)  F (jv)]
; (27)
or
nX
j=1
jj [F (v^j)  F (jv)] < 0 and  
Pn
j=1 j (v^j   jv)Pn
j=1 jj [F (v^j)  F (jv)]
: (28)
The optimal stocking policy is more complicated than in our earlier one-type analysis.
Specically, because the js depend on (; v), it is clear from equations (27) and (28) that
the intermediary may no longer use a simple threshold rule when deciding what to stock.
Nevertheless the main insights from our earlier analysis are robust. According to equation
(27) the intermediary stocks protable products if and only if their  is su¢ ciently high
given the values of (1; : : : ; n). Similarly according to equation (28) the intermediary
stocks loss-making products if and only if their  is su¢ ciently low given the values of
(1; : : : ; n). Intuitively, as we have seen earlier in the paper, this maximizes gains from
protable products and minimizes losses from unprotable products while simultaneously
making it attractive for consumers to search.
7.3 Upstream competition
We now extend our baseline model by introducing upstream manufacturer competition.
When a product has multiple varieties produced by di¤erent upstream manufacturers,
stocking some of them will make the non-contracted ones less prominentfor consumers
who visit the intermediary rst. This makes manufacturers more willing to sell their
products through the intermediary and has interesting e¤ects on the contract terms. In
particular, due to upstream competition the intermediary can even make direct prot from
exclusively stocked products. Nevertheless the intermediarys optimal product selection
is qualitatively similar to earlier. This extension also illustrates how our framework can
be used to study both product breadth and product depth.
Suppose that each product (category) i has a unit-continuum of symmetric di¤eren-
tiated varieties, each produced by a di¤erent manufacturer at the same marginal cost ci.
We capture di¤erentiation by assuming that each variety is either a matchor else has
no value for the consumer.49 A consumer wishes to buy Qi (pi) units of one matched
48In the spirit of Lemma 2 we can derive simple conditions under which the intermediarys prot is
strictly positive. For example, when j (; v) 2 f0; 1g it is su¢ cient that there exists a convex set 
0  

such that j (; v) = 1 for all j and (; v) 2 
0, i.e. each consumer type needs all the products in 
0.
49As we describe below, this double-continuumframework is a tractable way to introduce upstream
product di¤erentiation into the (; v) approach. Considering a discrete number of varieties would be
messy except in the special case where they are all homogeneous.
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variety of each product. We assume that matches occur with a Poisson rate  > 0, and
so the probability that a consumer matches with one or more of q  1 varieties is
(q)  1  e q ;
which is increasing and concave in q. In the spirit of our earlier analysis, we assume
that consumers cannot observe whether a variety is a match until they have searched its
seller, and also assume that the cost of searching the intermediary depends on the total
measure of varieties that it stocks (counted both within and across categories).50 We also
simplify the analysis by assuming that before they have searched anything, consumers
make a one-o¤ decision of whether or not to visit the intermediary, and do so if it strictly
increases their payo¤. We also assume that s is su¢ ciently large that not all consumers
search the intermediary in equilibrium. The model and timing are otherwise the same as
earlier. For simplicity here we focus on the simple case as in Section 3.
Given the way we model product di¤erentiation, it is still an equilibrium for each
seller to charge its monopoly price. In particular, closely following Lemma 1, the in-
termediary uses bilaterally-e¢ cient two-part tari¤s to avoid double marginalization, and
the search friction nullies competition between sellers of two varieties of the same prod-
uct.51 Consequently we can still represent products as points in a two-dimensional (; v)
space, although at each point there is now a continuum of varieties. Henceforth we let
q (; v) 2 [0; 1] denote the measure of varieties of product (; v) stocked by the interme-
diary.
Consumer search behavior. We prove that a consumers expected surplus, if she chooses
to visit the intermediary, is
u1 (s;q) =
Z
(q)vdG  s
Z
qdG+
Z
v>s=
[1  (q)](1  q)

v   s


dG : (29)
The rst two terms are the surplus obtained at the intermediary: with probability (q)
a consumer nds a matched variety of product (; v) and gets surplus v, while the total
cost of searching the intermediary is s
R
qdG in the simple case. The third term is the
surplus obtained from manufacturers: with probability 1 (q) a consumer does not nd
a matched variety of product (; v) at the intermediary, and (it can be shown) obtains
(1  q) (v   s=) in expectation from searching the remaining 1  q manufacturers, such
that it is worthwhile to search among them only if v > s=. Following a similar logic, a
consumers expected surplus from not visiting the intermediary can be shown to equal
50Notice that compared to the main model, the costs of searching the intermediary and a manufacturer
are scaled down by an order, but that this does not qualitatively a¤ect consumer search behavior.
51Once a consumer nds a match she has no incentive to search other varieties of that product, because
all rms charge the same price and her search cost is strictly positive. (One subtlety is that we now require
f (0) = 0 to ensure monopoly pricing when a positive fraction of varieties is stocked by manufacturers.)
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u0 (s;q) =
Z
v>s=
(1  q)

v   s


dG : (30)
Consumers follow a cut-o¤ search rule. Specically, there exists a unique s^ such that
u1 (s^;q) = u0 (s^;q). Consumers with s < s^ rst search the intermediary and buy a
product (; v) if they nd a matched variety, and then search among manufacturers for
unmatched varieties of products with v > s=. Consumers with s  s^ do not visit the
intermediary and instead search among manufacturers for products with v > s=.
Intermediary prot. We prove that the intermediarys prot from stocking a measure
q of varieties of product (; v) when v  s^= is
l (q; ; v) = 

F (s^)(q)  F (v) (1)  (q)
1  q q

: (31)
The rst term is gross prot: the intermediary is searched by consumers with s < s^ and a
match occurs with probability  (q). The second term is manufacturer compensation: it
can be shown that the intermediary makes a lump-sum transfer F (v) [(1)  (q)] = (1  q)
to each of the q manufacturers whose variety it stocks. Interestingly, this per-manufacturer
compensation is decreasing in q due to a novel prominence e¤ect. Intuitively, a stand-
alone manufacturer is only searched by consumers with s  v who did not nd a matched
variety at the intermediary. As q increases so does the probability of a consumer nding
a match at the intermediary, leading to a fall in demand (and prot) of manufacturers
who sell direct. It is straightforward to show that the intermediarys prot (31) is strictly
positive and increasing in q for all q > 0 i.e. as in our earlier analysis, low-v products are
prot-generators.
We also prove that the intermediarys prot from stocking a measure q of varieties of
product (; v) when v > s^= is
h (q; ; v) = 

F (s^)(q)  F (s^) (1)  (q)
1  q q   [F (v)  F (s^)]
(1  q)
1  q q

: (32)
The rst term is again the intermediarys gross prot, while the remaining terms are
lump-sum transfers to manufacturers. Concerning the latter, it can be shown that if
a manufacturer rejects the intermediarys o¤er it sells to consumers with s  s^ with
probability [(1)  (q)] = (1  q), and sells to consumers with s 2 (s^; v) with probability
(1   q)= (1  q). The former probability is the same as in equation (31) and so is
decreasing in q due to the prominence e¤ect. However, the latter probability is increasing
in q, because consumers with s 2 (s^; v) only search manufacturers, and when q is higher
each manufacturer faces less competition. An important di¤erence with earlier analysis is
that high-v products can now be protable (32) is strictly positive whenever v is close to
s^=, because upstream competition reduces the lump-sum transfer paid to manufacturers.
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Optimal product selection. As usual we can solve the intermediarys problem using the
Lagrangian method. The optimal stocking policy for products with v  s^= is straight-
forward, and depends on two thresholds l(v) < l(v). The fraction of varieties of a
given product (; v) stocked by the intermediary is weakly increasing in , and equals 0
for   l(v) and equals 1 for   l(v). Intuitively the (positive) prot earned from
stocking a product is concave in q due to concavity of the matching function  (q), and
so the intermediary maximizes gains from these products by stocking more varieties of
those with higher , much like in our earlier analysis.
The optimal stocking policy for products with v > s^= is more complicated, and it is
helpful to characterize it using two thresholds v < v. Among products with v < v,
the fraction of varieties stocked by the intermediary is weakly increasing in  > 0, and
equals 1 for  su¢ ciently high. Intuitively, upstream competition turns these products
into prot-generators, so by the usual logic the intermediary maximizes these gains by
stocking more of them as  increases. On the other hand, among products with v > v,
the fraction of varieties stocked by the intermediary is weakly decreasing in  > 0, and
equals 0 for  su¢ ciently high. Intuitively, as in our earlier analysis these products
are loss-makers, and the losses become more severe as q increases due to the second
prominence e¤ect identied earlier. Hence the intermediary minimizes its losses by
stocking fewer varieties of products with larger . The characterization is more complex
for products with v 2 (v; v), but we can show that the optimal fraction of varieties
stocked lies within two bounds, which tighten monotonically as  increases and converge.
(The details can be found in a separate supplementary document.)
Finally, our analysis in this section may also provide some new insights into private la-
bels. Empirical studies typically nd that retailers are able to negotiate higher margins on
national brands when they also stock private labels (see e.g. Ailawadi et al (2010)). Since
private labels can be regarded as exclusive products, this would be consistent with our
rst prominencee¤ect. To our knowledge such an explanation for a retailers improved
bargaining position is new to the literature.
8 Conclusion
This paper has developed a new and tractable framework for studying multiproduct in-
termediaries. We hope that this framework will be useful in future work, especially in
situations where product heterogeneity and multiproduct demand are important. Using
our framework, we have shown that (i) the intermediary earns strictly positive prot even
if it does not improve search e¢ ciency, provided that it can use exclusive contracts and
consumers demand multiple products; (ii) the optimal product range is relatively simple
to characterize, and reects endogenous cross-product externalities which arise due to the
search friction. Specically, some exclusive products are used to attract consumers who
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then generate prot for the intermediary by buying its other non-exclusive products; and
(iii) the intermediary tends to be too big, and stock too many products exclusively, com-
pared to the social optimum. Moreover (iv) our framework can also shed light on some
important trends in intermediary markets, such as increased use of exclusivity arrange-
ments, growth of large retailers and decline of small ones, and the rise of DTC sales. For
instance, we show how easier DTC sales harm the intermediary by reducing its bargaining
power, and induce the intermediary to redesign its product selection.
Our paper has mainly focused on retailers, but its insights apply to a much broader
set of multiproduct intermediaries. One example is shopping malls, which we discussed
earlier in Section 5. Another pertinent example is TV platforms. Traditionally, content
providers mainly reached viewers through TV subscription services. However in recent
years Disney, HBO, ESPN and several others have launched (or committed to launch)
DTC channels.52 Our model can be applied to understand how this might a¤ect the
industry: the manufacturers in our model can be interpreted as content providers, whilst
the search friction could be interpreted more broadly as encompassing the costs of nding,
subscribing to, and paying for various services.53 Our model then provides implications
about, for example, what channels a cable TV company will carry and how it is a¤ected
by the introduction of DTC channels. Another example where our framework could be
applied is international trade, because intermediaries play an important role in helping
domestic manufacturers to export.54 In that case foreign importers are like the consumers
in our model, whilst trade frictions are similar to our search cost. Depending on how easy
it is for individual manufacturers to export on their own (which is like DTC in our model),
they may choose to sell via an intermediary. Hence by modifying our model one could
obtain insights about which products should be exported, and by whom.
Throughout the paper we have focused on a single intermediary. It would be interesting
to study how competition between intermediaries (or a merger of two intermediaries)
shapes their product ranges. Our (; v) approach may not apply straightforwardly to this
setting, in which case some modied techniques would need to be developed. We plan to
think more about this in future work.
52See https://tcrn.ch/2AsRRLm for details on Disney and ESPN, and https://bit.ly/2JqS4XU for
details on HBOs HBO Nowservice.
53See https://bit.ly/2JsDfEb for arguments why these costs can be much lower when content is bundled
rather than sold direct.
54See e.g. Bernard et al (2010) and Ahn et al (2011) for empirical evidence on trade intermediaries in
the US and China respectively.
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Online Appendix
In this online appendix, we report all the omitted details and proofs of the paper
(except those for Section 7 which can be found in a separate supplementary document).
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Consider an equilibrium in which a set AM of products
are sold only by their manufacturers, a set AE of products are stocked exclusively by the
intermediary, and a set ANE of products are stocked non-exclusively by the intermediary.
Let pl be the equilibrium price of product l 2 AM , pj be the equilibrium price of product
j 2 AE, and pi;M and pi;I be the equilibrium price of product i 2 ANE at its manufacturer
and the intermediary, respectively. Note that if pi;I > pi;M it is possible that a consumer
visits the intermediary which stocks product i but buys product i from its manufacturer.
However if pi;I  pi;M it is impossible that in equilibrium a consumer visits both the
intermediary and the manufacturer.
(i-1) As in the case of no intermediary, it is easy to see pl = pml for l 2 AM given our
informational assumption.
(i-2) We then show pj = pmj for j 2 AE. Suppose the wholesale price of product
j is  j. The hold-up logic as explained in the main text implies that the intermediary
must charge pj ( j) = argmaxp (p   j)Qj (p). (Note that pj (cj) = pmj .) Since the
intermediary makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, it will optimally o¤er a lump-sum fee Tj =
jF (vj) ( j   cj)Qj(pj ( j)) to manufacturer j, where  is the measure of consumers
who visit the intermediary and which only depends on the expected surplus from visiting
the intermediary. (In particular, given consumers do not observe the contract details, 
is independent of the actual wholesale price  j.) Hence the intermediarys prot from
stocking product j exclusively is
  [pj ( j)   j]Qj(pj ( j))  Tj =  

pj ( j)  cj

Qj(p

j ( j))  jF (vj) : (33)
This is maximized at pj ( j) = p
m
j such that the intermediary should o¤er a wholesale
price  j = cj.
(i-3) We nally show pi;I = pi;M = pmi for i 2 ANE. The proof consists of a few steps.
Step 1: pi;M  pmi .
If in contrast pi;M > pmi in equilibrium, then reducing pi;M slightly will be a protable
deviation. First, the number of consumers who buy product i from respectively the
intermediary and manufacturer i does not change. For those consumers who visit the
intermediary and buy product i there, they do not observe manufacturer is price reduction
and so still buy from the intermediary. For those consumers who visit the intermediary
rst and then come to manufacturer i, they will be surprised by the price reduction but
will still buy from manufacturer i as originally planned. The number of such consumers
does not increase since their search decision is based on expected equilibrium prices. For
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those who visit manufacturer i rst, their initial plan must be to buy product i at the
manufacturer (otherwise they would have no reason to visit it). Again a private price
reduction will not increase the number of such consumers, and once they arrive they buy
as planned (given passive beliefs). Second then, manufacturer i earns strictly more prot
from its direct sales to consumers, and earns the same prot from sales made through the
intermediary.
Step 2: pi;M = pmi .
If in contrast pi;M < pmi in equilibrium, then increasing pi;M slightly will be a protable
deviation. Consider the following two cases separately:
(a) pi;I > pi;M . Consider a slight increase to pi;M + " < minfpi;I ; pmi g. For those who
visit the intermediary rst and then come to manufacturer i (based on the expected price),
they will be surprised by manufacturer is price increase but will still buy from it since
its price remains strictly below pi;I . For those who visit manufacturer i rst (again, based
on the expected price), they will buy as planned given the new price is still lower than
pi;I . Therefore, the number of consumers who buy at manufacturer i remains unchanged,
but the prot from each of them is now higher.
(b) pi;I  pi;M . For those who visit the intermediary rst, they will not come to
manufacturer i according to their beliefs, so they are irrelevant for a private price devi-
ation. For those who plan to visit manufacturer i, they must not visit the intermediary
on equilibrium path. If pi;M is slightly increased, will some of them switch to visiting
the intermediary? The answer is no, because in our continuum framework this single
price deviation has a zero-measure impact on the consumer surplus from not visiting the
intermediary and so will not change consumer search behavior.55 Therefore again a small
price increase will improve manufacturer is prot.
Step 3: pi;I  pmi .
Suppose in contrast pi;I > pmi (= pi;M) in equilibrium. In this case, there are two
possible types of consumer who buy product i. Let i;I be the measure of consumers
who buy i at the intermediary, and let i;M be the measure of consumers who buy i at
manufacturer i. (Some of the latter consumers may visit the intermediary but buy from
the manufacturer.) Consider two cases separately:
(a)  i  ci. Then a small reduction of pi;I will be a protable deviation. Slightly
decreasing pi;I will weakly increase i;I . At the same time the intermediary makes a
higher prot from each such consumer given that pi ( i)  pmi < pi;I .
55With a discrete number of products, the same result holds by a slightly di¤erent argument. Consider
a consumer who is ex ante indi¤erent between whether or not to visit the intermediary. If she visits
manufacturer i and nds pi;M slightly higher than expected, will she now want to visit the intermediary?
Since the cost of visiting the manufacturer is already sunk, she actually would have a strict preference
for not visiting the intermediary if pi;M remained the same as expected. Therefore the same is true if
pi;M is only slightly higher than she expected.
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(b)  i > ci. In this case we argue that a deviation to p0i;I = p
m
i (together with an
adjustment of the two-part tari¤) will be protable. In the hypothetical equilibrium, we
must have
Ti + i;I  ( i   ci)Qi(pi;I) + i;M  i = iF (vi) :
Then the intermediarys prot from product i is
i;I  (pi;I    i)Qi(pi;I)  Ti = i;I  (pi;I   ci)Qi(pi;I) + i;M  i   iF (vi) :
If pi;I is reduced to pmi , (pi;I   ci)Qi(pi;I) will increase to i, the per-consumer monopoly
prot, and i;I + i;M will increase at least weakly.
56 Then the prot must be improved.
Step 4: pi;I = pmi .
Suppose in contrast pi;I < pmi (= pi;M) in equilibrium. Then if a consumer visits the
intermediary, she will not visit manufacturer i. In this case it is then impossible that
 i  ci. Otherwise the intermediary could improve its prot from product i by raising
pi;I slightly. (Note that this deviation does not a¤ect the number of consumers who visit
the intermediary, and once they arrive they will still buy product i at the intermediary
as long as pi;I is still below pi;M .)
Now consider the possibility of  i < ci. Then we must have pi;I = pi ( i) in an
equilibrium. Then a deviation to  0i = ci and p
0
i;I = p
m
i will be protable. (Given the
contract details are unobservable to consumers, such a deviation will not a¤ect the number
of consumers who visit the intermediary and buy i.)
This completes the proof for pi;I = pi;M = pmi for i 2 ANE.
(ii) The equilibrium two-part tari¤ for product j 2 AE has been proved in (i-2)
above. Now consider the equilibrium two-part tari¤ for product i 2 ANE. It is easy to
see that  i < ci is impossible. Otherwise the intermediary would have an incentive to
reduce its price for product i to pi ( i). However, we cannot rule out the possibility of
 i > ci (together with Ti such that manufacturer is prot is iF (vi)). The reason is
that if the intermediary raises its price for product i above pmi , some consumers who visit
the intermediary and initially planned to buy i there may then switch to buying from
manufacturer i. If the number of such consumers is large enough (which requires f(s) to
be large enough for small s), the intermediary does not wish to raise its price.
Fortunately, this indeterminacy of the contract details does not matter for our subse-
quent analysis of optimal product selection. Suppose in an equilibrium  i 6= ci for some
56In fact, it can be shown that i;I+i;M remains unchanged. The consumers who buy product i can be
divided into three groups: some dont visit the intermediary and buy i at manufacturer i; some visit the
intermediary but buy i at manufacturer i; the rest visit the intermediary and buy i there. The deviation
does not a¤ect the rst group. The deviation may a¤ect the distribution of consumers between the second
and the third group, but does not a¤ect the total number of consumers who visit the intermediary which
only depends on the expected prices.
46
i 2 ANE. The lump-sum fee Ti satises
Ti + i;I  ( i   ci)Qi(pi;I) + i;M  i = iF (vi) :
Note that given the monopoly pricing result, i;I is also the number of consumers who visit
the intermediary which is denoted by I . Then the intermediarys prot from stocking
product i is
I  (pmi    i)Qi(pmi )  Ti = I  (pmi   ci)Qi(pmi ) + i;M  i   iF (vi)
= i [I   (F (vi)  i;M)] : (34)
Since consumer search and purchase behavior only depends on the retail prices, this
prot is the same as if  i = ci. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can focus on a
contracting outcome with  i = ci.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) We rst show that the intermediary can make a positive
prot by stocking a positive measure of products. Consider two interior points in
: (1; ~v)
and (2; ~v) with 1 > 2. Let A1 = [1   ; 1]  [~v   ; ~v] and A2 = [2; 2 +(v)] 
[~v; ~v + ], where (v) is uniquely dened for each v 2 [~v; ~v + ] byZ 1
1 
g (; 2~v   v) d =
Z 2+(v)
2
g (; v) d : (35)
Convexity of 
 implies that we have A1; A2  
 for su¢ ciently small   0 and  > 0.
Notice that (v) is constructed in such a way that for each v in A2, the mass of products
stocked is the same as that of the mirrorvaluation 2~v   v in A1. This implies that
the average v of the products in A1 [ A2 is always ~v, and so a consumer will visit the
intermediary, when it stocks A = A1 [ A2, if and only if s < ~v.
Fix a su¢ ciently small  such that 1    > 2 + (v) for all v 2 [~v; ~v + ]. The
intermediarys prot from stocking A = A1 [ A2 is
~ () =
Z ~v
~v 
Z 1
1 
 [F (~v)  F (v)] dG+
Z ~v+
~v
Z 2+(v)
2
 [F (~v)  F (v)] dG : (36)
Straightforward calculations reveal that ~(0) = ~0 (0) = 0. However,
~00 (0) = f (~v) [
Z 1
1 
g (; ~v) d  
Z 2+(~v)
2
g (; ~v) d]
> f (~v) [(1   )
Z 1
1 
g (; ~v) d   (2 +(~v))
Z 2+(~v)
2
g (; ~v) d]
= f (~v) [(1   )  (2 +(~v))]
Z 1
1 
g (; ~v) d > 0 ;
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where the second equality used (35) evaluated at v = ~v. Therefore, ~ () > 0 for  in a
neighborhood of 0.
(ii) We then show that stocking all the products is not the most protable strategy.
Let v =
R


vdG. Consider B1 = [1   ; 1]  [v; v + ] and B2 = [2; 2 +(v)] 
[v   ; v], where 1 > 2, and where (v) is uniquely dened for each v 2 [v   ; v]
by Z 1
1 
g (; 2v   v) d =
Z 2+(v)
2
g (; v) d : (37)
Convexity of 
 implies that B1; B2  
 for su¢ ciently small   0 and  > 0. Similarly
as above, the average v of the products in B1 [ B2 is always v, and so the average v
in A = 
n (B1 [B2) is v as well. Then a consumer will visit the intermediary, when it
stocks A = 
n (B1 [B2), if and only if s < v.
Fix a su¢ ciently small  such that 1    > 2 + (v) for all v 2 [v   ; v]. The
intermediarys prot from stocking A = 
n (B1 [B2) is
 () =  (0) 
Z v+
v
Z 1
1 
 [F (v)  F (v)] dG 
Z v
v 
Z 2+(v)
2
 [F (v)  F (v)] dG ;
where  (0) is the prot from stocking 
. Simple calculations reveal that 0 (0) = 0.
However, similar as in (i),
00 (0) = f (v) [
Z 1
1 
g (; v) d  
Z 2+(v)
2
g (; v) d] > 0
by using (37) evaluated at v = v. Therefore,  () >  (0) for  in a neighborhood of
0.
Proof of Lemma 3. The di¤erence in payo¤ between u1 (s;q) dened in (10) and
u0 (s;q) dened in (11) is
(s) =
Z
qvdG  h
Z
qdG

s 
Z
v>s
qNE (v   s) dG : (38)
(We have used q qE = qNE.) Notice that (0)  0, and (s) is weakly concave because
0(s) =  h
Z
qdG

+
Z
v>s
qNEdG
is weakly decreasing in s. No consumer visits the intermediary (i.e. s^ = 0) if and only
if (s)  0 for all s > 0. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for this is (0) = 0 and
0 (0)  0, which is equivalent to the conditions stated in (i). All consumers visit the
intermediary (i.e. s^ > s) if and only if (s) > 0 for all s > 0. A necessary and su¢ cient
condition for this is (s) > 0, which simplies to the condition in (ii). Finally in all
other cases, (s) > 0 for s in a neighborhood of 0, and (s)  0, so given that (s) is
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weakly concave consumers use a cut-o¤ strategy. Consumers strictly prefer visiting the
intermediary if they have s < s^, where s^ solves (s^) = 0. (12) is just a rewriting of
(s^) = 0.57
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall the areas A1 and A2 that were dened in the proof of
Lemma 2, and let v () be the unique solution to
~m =
Z
A1[A2
dG+
Z
v>v()
dG :
Notice that since ~m is bounded away from 1 and 
 is convex, we can nd ~v su¢ ciently
close to v, and  > 0 su¢ ciently small, such that for  > 0 su¢ ciently small we have both
A1; A2  
 and v () > ~v + .
Suppose the intermediary stocks products inA1 andA2 exclusively and stocks products
with v > v () non-exclusively. Firstly notice that for any  > 0 we have s^  ~v. To see
this, note that by the denition of (s) in equation (38) we have
(~v) =
Z
qvdG  h
Z
qdG

~v  
Z
v>~v
qNE (v   ~v) dG

Z
A1[A2
vdG  ~v
Z
A1[A2
dG = 0 ;
where the inequality uses h
 R
qdG

= h ( ~m)  ~m, and the nal equality follows since
A1 [ A2 is constructed to have average valuation ~v. Then the proof of Lemma 3 shows
that (~v)  0 implies s^  ~v. Secondly, recall that non-exclusive products with v < s^
earn positive prot, and non-exclusive products with v > s^ earn zero prot. Therefore
since s^  ~v the intermediarys prot is weakly larger than in equation (36) in the proof of
Lemma 2, and in that proof we showed that this prot is strictly positive for some  > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. As a preliminary step, the slackness conditions for the
space constraint are ( m   m) = 0 and   0. Hence,  = 0 if m < m in the optimal
solution, and  is irrelevant if m = m since in that case the binding space constraint is
the same as (15). Also, when the intermediary makes a strictly positive prot, we must
have s^ > 0 so that some consumers visit it.
First, we characterize the optimal product selection for given parameters (s^; ; ).
From (17) it is clear that for a product with v < s^, q = 1 if and only if
 [F (s^)  F (v)] + v     0,     v
F (s^)  F (v) ; (39)
57Notice that (0) = 0 if the intermediary only stocks products non-exclusively (i.e. if q = qNE). In
that case, (s^) = 0 has one zero solution and another strictly positive solution under our conditions. The
zero solution should be discarded.
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and the exclusivity arrangement does not matter. From (17) it is also clear that for a
product with v > s^, qE = 1 if and only if
 [F (s^)  F (v)] + v     maxf0; s^  g ,   maxfs^; g   v
F (s^)  F (v) : (40)
When the opposite is true, qNE = 1 if s^    > 0, qNE = 0 if s^    < 0, and the
intermediary is indi¤erent between qNE = 0 and qNE = 1 if s^    = 0. (As we explain
below, in the third case there is exibility over which products are stocked.)
Second, we give the conditions for determining the parameters. It is useful to consider
a few cases separately:
(a) Suppose the optimal solution has s^ < s.58 Then s^ satises (14). Since s^ is interior,
the rst-order condition of (17) with respect to s^ gives
 = f(s^)
R
v<s^
qdG+
R
v>s^
qEdG
h(m)  R
v>s^
qNEdG
> 0 : (41)
(Notice that  > 0 since  and s^ dened in (12) share the same denominator.) If m < m
in the optimal solution, then  = 0 as we have pointed out and so the rst-order condition
of (17) with respect to m gives
 = s^h0 (m)  0 ; (42)
and (s^; ; ;m) jointly solve equations (14), (15), (41) and (42). If m = m in the optimal
solution,  is irrelevant as we have explained. Note that if m = m < 1 then (s^; ; )
jointly solve equations (14), (15) and (41) with m replaced by m everywhere, and we can
conclude that   0.59 Note that if insteadm = m = 1 then  does not matter so without
loss of generality we can set  = 0, and (s^; ) jointly solve equations (14) and (41) with
m replaced by m.60 (Regardless of whether (16) binds or not, when s^   = 0 we have
an additional equation, and this determines the measure of products with v > s^ that are
stocked non-exclusively.)
(b) Suppose the optimal solution has s^ > s.61 Then there is no region of v > s^ given
our focus on v  s. The value of s^ now does not a¤ect the product selection which is
characterized by (39) with F (s^) = 1. As stated in the text  = 0 in this case. We can also
58According to Lemma 3 a stocking policy q induces s^ < s when
R
qvdG < h
 R
qdG

s. A su¢ cient
condition for this to hold is maxx
R v
x
vdG=h
R v
x
dG

< s, which is easily satised when economies of
search are weak or when s v.
59Notice that if to the contrary  < 0, then rstly the righthand side of (39) is strictly negative, and
secondly s^    > 0. Hence all products should be stocked, which contradicts m = m < 1. The same
argument applies in parts (b) and (c) below when m = m < 1.
60Note that the righthand side of (39) is weakly negative and that s^   0, so this is consistent with
m = 1. A similar argument applies in part (b) below when m = m = 1.
61According to Lemma 3, s^ > s in the optimal solution requires
R
qvdG > h ( m) s.
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deduce that m = m in the optimal solution. Suppose to the contrary that m < m: (42)
implies  = 0, and so (17) is increasing in q for all products which contradicts m < m. If
m = m < 1 in the optimal solution then   0 is determined by m = R qdG, where q = 1
for the products satisfying (39). If instead m = m = 1 then  does not matter and so we
can without loss of generality set  = 0.
(c) Suppose the optimal solution has s^ = s.62 Again, there is no region of v > s^ in
this case. Notice that if m < 1 in the optimal solution then it must be that   0.63 If
m < m in the optimal solution, (; ;m) jointly solve equations (14) with s^ = s, (15) and
(42). If m = m < 1 in the optimal solution,  and   0 jointly solve (14) with s^ = s
and m =
R
qdG, where q = 1 for the products satisfying (39). If instead m = m = 1 then
 does not matter so we can set  = 0, and any   0 is consistent with the right-hand
side of (39) being weakly negative such that every product is indeed stocked.
Proof of Corollary 1. This is immediate from cases (a) and (c) in the proof of
Proposition 2. (Note that we must have m = m in case (b).)
Omitted details in Section 4.3 and Proof of Proposition 3. In the problem of
socially optimal product range choice, the consumer search rule is the same as in Lemma
3. Total welfare can then be written as
W (q) 
Z
F (v) dG+(q) +
Z s^
0
u1 (s;q) dF (s) +
Z s
s^
u0 (s;q) dF (s) : (43)
The rst term is prot earned by manufacturers. Note that a manufacturer earns F (v)
regardless of whether or not it sells via the intermediary. The second term is the inter-
mediarys prot, which we dened earlier in equation (13). The remaining two terms
are consumer surplus. Consumers with s < s^ search the intermediary and earn u1 (s;q),
which we dened in equation (10). Meanwhile consumers with s  s^ do not search the in-
termediary and so earn u0 (s;q), which we dened in equation (11). When some products
with v > s^ are stocked exclusively, consumers with s  s^ are made worse o¤ because they
cannot buy all the products they would like to. At the same time, consumers with s < s^
buy some low-v products that ordinarily they would not purchase, and so depending on
the strength of economies of search may or may not be better o¤.
62According to Lemma 3, s^ = s in the optimal solution requires
R
qvdG = h (m) s.
63Suppose to the contrary that  < 0. Then the prot  [F (s^)  F (v)] = [1 F (v)] of products along
the boundary of the set dened by (39) equals   v which is now strictly increasing in v. Suppose the
intermediary replaces a strictly positive measure of low-v products close to the boundary which it stocks
under q, with a strictly positive measure of higher-v products close to the boundary which it does not
stock under q. This can be done so that m does not change given m < 1, and by Lemma 3 we would have
s^ > s so that all consumers still visit the intermediary. At the same time, the newly added products are
more protable than the removed ones because the boundary is increasing. Therefore, the above change
must improve the intermediarys prot, which yields a contradiction.
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The social planner wishes to maximize (43). The proof that the social optimum has
m > 0 uses a similar technique to the one in the proof of Lemma 4 and so is omitted.
The optimization problem can be solved by using the same techniques as we did earlier
for prot maximization. We again use m =
R
qdG to denote the measure of products
stocked by the intermediary.
Substituting the expressions for (q), u1 (s;q) and u0 (s;q) into equation (43), we get
W (q) =
Z
(1  q)
Z v
0
( + v   s)dF (s)dG+
Z
q( + v)F (s^)dG
 h(m)
Z s^
0
sdF (s) +
Z
v>s^
qNE
Z v
s^
( + v   s)dF (s)dG : (44)
MaximizingW (q) is the same as maximizingW (q) W (0) i.e. the welfare improvement
due to the intermediary. We therefore maximize W (q) W (0) subject to the constraints
(14), (15) and (16), and let ,  and  be the associated Lagrange multipliers.
After some algebraic manipulations, we can write the Lagrange function as follows:
L =
Z
v<s^
q

( + v) [F (s^)  F (v)] + v   +
Z v
0
sdF (s)

| {z }
[1]
dG
+
Z
v>s^
8>>><>>>:qE

( + v) [F (s^)  F (v)] + v   +
Z v
0
sdF (s)

| {z }
[2]
+ qNE

s^  +
Z s^
0
sdF (s)

| {z }
[3]
9>>>=>>>; dG
  h(m)

s^+
Z s^
0
sdF (s)

+ m+ ( m m) : (45)
This problem is similar to the prot-maximizing one. As before  = 0 if m < m in the
optimal solution, and  is irrelevant if m = m.
For given parameters (s^; ; ), products with v < s^ will be stocked if [1]  0, which
leads to (20). In this region, the exclusivity arrangement does not matter. Products with
v > s^ will be stocked exclusively if [2]  maxf0; [3]g, which leads to (21). When the
opposite is true, they will be stocked non-exclusively if [3] > 0.
We now explain how to determine the parameters (s^; ; ). Here we only consider the
case where the optimal solution has s^ < s. (The case of s^ > s or s^ = s can be easily dealt
with like we did in the proof of Proposition 2.) Taking the rst order condition of (45)
with respect to s^ and then using equation (12) to cancel terms, we obtain
 = f(s^)
R
v<s^
qdG+
R
v>s^
qEdG
h(m)  R
v>s^
qNEdG
> 0 : (46)
This is the same as equation (41) from the proof of Proposition 2. If m < m in the
optimal solution, then  = 0 and so the rst-order condition of (45) with respect to m
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gives
 = h0(m)

s^+
Z s^
0
sdF (s)

 0 ; (47)
Then (s^; ; ;m) jointly solve equations (14), (15), (46) and (47). If m = m in the
optimal solution,  is irrelevant as we have explained. Note that if m = m < 1 then
(s^; ; ) jointly solve equations (14), (15) and (46) with m replaced by m everywhere, and
we can conclude that   0 as in the proof of Proposition 2. If instead m = m = 1 then
 does not matter so without loss of generality we can set  = 0, and (s^; ) jointly solve
equations (14) and (46) with m replaced by m.
Omitted details in Section 5.2 and Proofs for Proposition 4 and Corollaries
2-4. Since much of the analysis is similar to the baseline model in Section 4, here we
sketch the details and then prove the main results.
As in the baseline model, given a stocking policy q(; v; ) a consumers expected
utilities from respectively searching and not searching the intermediary are
u1(s;q) =
Z
qvdG  h
Z
qdG

s+
Z
v>s
(1  q)(v   s)dG ;
and
u0(s;q) =
Z
v>s
(1  qE)(v   s)dG :
As usual one can verify that u1(s;q) u0(s;q) is weakly concave and non-negative at s = 0.
Using the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 3, we can then show that consumers use
a cut-o¤ search rule and will visit the intermediary if and only if s < s^. For example, in
the interior solution case with s^ 2 (0; s], s^ is determined by
s^ =
R
v<s^
qvdG+
R
v>s^
qEvdG
h(
R
qdG)  R
v>s^
qNEdG
: (48)
Following similar steps as in the baseline model and noting that a manufacturers
outside option from not selling at all through the intermediary is F (v=), we can write
the intermediarys prot as:Z
v<s^
q
h
F (s^)  F
v

i
dG+
Z
v>s^
qE
h
F (s^)  F
v

i
dG : (49)
Proof of Proposition 4. Solving the intermediary optimization problem is very
similar to the baseline model, so again we only report the main steps. The denition of
s^ can be rewritten asZ
v<s^
qvdG+
Z
v>s^
(qEv + qNEs^)dG  h(m)s^ = 0 ;
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where m =
R
qdG, and the stocking space constraint is m  m. Then the Lagrangian of
the problem is
L =
Z
v<s^
q
n

h
F (s^)  F
v

i
+ v   
o
dG
+
Z
v>s^
n
qE
h

h
F (s^)  F
v

i
+ v   
i
+ qNE(s^  )
o
dG
  s^h(m) + m+ ( m m) :
It is then straightforward to derive the characterization of optimal product selection re-
ported in Proposition 4. As in the baseline model, both  and  are non-negative in the
solution. In particular, whenever s^ is an interior solution (i.e. s^ < s), the rst-order
condition with respect to s^ yields
 = f(s^)
R
v<s^
qdG+
R
v>s^
qEdG
h(m)  R
v>s^
qNEdG
:
We now prove the three corollaries on DTC sales.
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider two sectors with 1 and 2 > 1 respectively. It
su¢ ces to show that if a product (; v) in sector 1 is stocked, then its counterpart in
sector 2 must be stocked.
Suppose v < 1s^ and the sum of the direct and indirect e¤ects in the rst line of L
with 1 is positive. Then clearly v < 2s^, and also the sum of the direct and indirect
e¤ects with 2 is positive as well.
If instead 1s^ < v < 2s^ and product (; v) in sector 1 is stocked exclusively, then
product (; v) in sector 2 must be stocked. If on the other hand 1s^ < v < 2s^ and
product (; v) in sector 1 is stocked non-exclusively (which implies 1s^   > 0), then
v    > 1s^    > 0. This, together with F (s^)   F (v=2) > 0, implies that the total
e¤ect in the rst line of L with 2 is positive and so product (; v) in sector 2 must be
stocked.
Finally, if v > 2s^ and product (; v) in sector 1 is stocked (exclusively or non-
exclusively), then at least one of the terms after qE and qNE in the second line of L
remain positive, so product (; v) in sector 2 must also be stocked.
Proof of Corollary 3. Firstly, since by assumption the space constraint is not
binding, the rst order condition of L with respect to m (after noting that  does not
matter) yields  = s^h0(m).
Secondly then, we have that s^    _    h0(m). It is then clear that if  > h0(m)
then all products with v > s^ are stocked (either exclusively or non-exclusively), whereas
if  < h0(m) then no products with v > s^ are stocked non-exclusively.
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Thirdly, consider the limit as v ! s^. As v approaches from the left the stocking
threshold tends to
s^
h0(m)  
F (s^)  F (v

)
;
which equals  1 when  > h0(m) and equals +1 when  < h0(m). As v approaches
from the right the stocking threshold for exclusivity tends to
s^maxf; h0(m)g   s^
F (s^)  F (v

)
;
which equals  1 when  < h0(m). The remainder of the claimed results in the corollary
then follow.
Proof of Corollary 4. First, consider manufacturer prots. When DTC sales
become easier the manufacturer of product (; v; ) earns F ( v
(;;v)
), regardless of where
its product is sold. Since (; ; v)   this is weakly higher than before.
Second, consider the intermediarys prot. Let q(; v; ) and ~q(; v; ) be the optimal
stocking policies before and after DTC sales become easier, respectively. Let s^ and ~s be
the associated search thresholds. Consider the situation before DTC sales become easier.
Suppose the intermediary adopts a stocking policy q0(; v; ) = ~q(; v; ) (which may not
be optimal), and let s^0 be the associated search threshold. Then from u1(s;q)  u0(s;q),
it is clear that consumersincentive to visit the intermediary must be higher than after
DTC sales become easier, which implies s^0  ~s. From (49), it is then clear that the
intermediarys prot under q0(; v; ) must be higher than that after DTC sales become
easier. The intermediary can do even better by choosing q(; v; ) before DTC sales
become easier. Consequently the intermediarys prot must fall when DTC sales become
easier.
55
